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Abstract
The writings of George Parkin Grant (1918-1988), a
Canadian political philosopher, were analyzed according to
his view of the relationship between technology and
education. Grant's life was summarized to provide a context
for understanding his ideas. His definition of technology -
- the co-penetration of knowing and making -- was
conceptually analyzed and placed within a reading of his
work that ascertained a progressive development of this
definition over three distinct phases in his academic
career. Grant's implicit vision of education, grounded in
Christian and Platonic epistemological assumptions, was
explicated and unified around his idea of the
interdependence of knowing and loving. From a comparison
with John Dewey's concepts of technology and education,
Grant and Dewey were found to be in substantial agreement
concerning the nature of modern technology, but in profound
disagreement over the meaning of an educative experience.
Grant's qualified, affirmative response to the question of
this thesis -- Is technology a threat to education? -- was
found insightful in helping to clarify some foundational
issues in educational research. As well, it provided
another perspective within which one can begin to assess the
general impact of technology on education.
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CHAPTER ONE: IS TECHNOLOGY A THREAT TO EDUCATION?
Are schools repositories of "technophobes" -- people
who cannot do so they teach? How many teachers are academic
cast-offs who could not cut the rigour of a scientific
education and so were denied a career in engineering or
medicine? Are they losers who, unable to understand science
and technology, took refuge on the sidelines of academia --
the increasingly irrelevant arts and humanities -- and ended
up in teaching careers because their B.A.s entitled them
prestige in little else? If this is so, it is no wonder
that North American students are rated so low in
international math and science competitions. According to
this view, the educational system has been, and continues to
be, an obstacle to the development of "high tech." If our
country is to remain economically competitive, our schools
need to be staffed by those excited by, and competent in,
those subjects which are the most important in our age --
math, science and computers.
On the other hand, ·is there any rational basis to the
uneasiness of those who feel that technology is a threat to
education? Are there good teachers who resist technological
innovations because they have some insight on how technology
adversely affects education? Notwithstanding Neil Postman's
(1992) advocacy of teaching as a conserving activity in a
culture that has surrendered to technology, it is difficult
to articulate a position urging caution when introducing new
2technologies such as computers into the classroom without
sounding like a shrill technophobe. This thesis is an
attempt to argue a cautionary position about technology
based on the writings of George Parkin Grant, a Canadian
educator who spent much time thinking about technology. It
is a conceptual study of the terms technology and education
employing Grant's use of those words as a focal point for
analysis. The thesis further attempts to clarify the nature
of the relationship between technology and education with
the aim of analyzing the argument that technology is a
threat to education. In the remainder of this introductory
chapter, a suggestion by Zodhiates (1988) will be analyzed
for the purpose of showing the problematic nature of the
relationship between technology and education and
demonstrating that a conceptual analysis of- those two terms
is necessary.
Two Definitions of Technology
That a conceptual ~nalysis of the word "technology" is
needed can be illustrated by the fact that educators use it
to draw opposite conclusions. What definition was employed
by Cuban (1986) and Nickerson (1988) who claimed that
technology has had little effect in changing educational
practice in the majority of North American schools? Cuban
defined technology in the classroom as "any device available
to teachers for use in instructing students in a more
3efficient and stimulating manner than the sole use of the
teacher's voice" (Cuban, 1986, p. 4). With technology
defined as machinery, Cuban has shown that for all the
grandiose predictions for educational change surrounding the
introduction of film, radio and television in schools since
1920, most instruction still consists in teacher talk,
blackboard and chalk, and textbook-based curricula.
On the other hand, a sociological definition of
technology -- "the totality of methods rationally arrived at
and having absolute efficiency" (Ellul, 1970, p. xxv)
leads to the opposite conclusion: Modern schools are
profoundly shaped by technology. Spring's (1972)
documentation of the historical development of American
publ'ic schooling as the socializing arm of the corporate
state, supported the argument that modern compulsory mass
education is a custodial filtering system designed to
program youngsters to fit into a technological society.
Indeed, within this sense of technology, schools can be seen
as being very responsive to the demands of efficiency
(Callahan, 1962). For example, the "new" math curriculum
was imposed on all North American schools in the 1960s in
order to better prepare and select students for "high tech"
as the United States scrambled to keep pace with the Soviet
Union in the space race.
Whatever definition one uses, the phenomenal impact of
computers challenges educators to face up to Feurzeig's
4(1988) prediction that "technology will come to have a deep
synergetic relationship with education -- and with work and
life. That is its destiny and ours" (p. 113). Teachers can
no longer close their doors to change, for young learners
will not be denied access to computers. State and society
will no longer tolerate any footdragging.
Even in Christian schools where teachers are encouraged
to be conservative transmitters of an old tradition, it is
expected that students learn the skills that will help them
keep pace in a changing world. For example, my colleagues1
approved a plan to teach computer skills to our elementary
pupils. The proposal sketched a classroom laboratory with a
computer for each student connected on a network system.
On the whole, the plan seemed acceptable except for one
statement in the rationale that described computers as a
gift from God. A lively discussion ensued at the staff
meeting which sparked a week-long debate between one
colleague and me via the staff room white board. At the
next meeting the offending phrase was deleted from the
rationale and the staff unanimously adopted the plan.
It is interesting to note that even though the
optimistic view of the computer as a divine blessing did not
gain total acceptance, no one on staff argued against the
practical import of the plan: to systematically incorporate
1 At the time of wri ting I teach in an independently-
financed, parental Christian day school.
5computers in our school's curricula.
Technophobia
Are there any reasonable grounds to fear technological
changes in schools? In the preface to a book which
summarized a "think tank" conference on technology in
education, Zodhiates (1988) prescribed the following which
might be interpreted as a palliative for those who suffer
from "technophobia":
Only after we have a reasonably clear idea of what it
means (or should mean) to be educated and of what we
would like an educational system to accomplish, should
we turn to the question of what role or roles
technology should play in the educational process. (p.
ix)
Zodhiates was asking us to consider carefully what
education is so that we can then decide the proper place for
technology. The assignment seems straightforward. First,
let us thoughtfully formulate our goals for education.
Second, let us decide how and what technology can most
effectively help teachers and learners attain these goals.
From Grant's perspective, there are several problems
with this assignment. Can we achieve a meaningful consensus
on the goals of education or even an agreement on what
education is? Do we even need diverse groups such as
classicists, technophiles, critical theorists, humanists,
6Christians, Muslims, Jews, ,Hindus, Buddhists or those of any
other faith to come to an agreement on educational goals
before deciding about the role of technology? If there can
be a pluralism of educational foundations but relative
agreement on the place of technology in each of these
various school systems2 , does it not follow that Zodhiates'
assignment is of little practical value? If this line of
thinking is extended further, one begins to suspect that the
development of technology is indifferent to educational
goals. In fact, it leads one to turn Zodhiates' suggestion
on its head: First, technology lays down the essential
parameters of modern existence. Second, we must continually
revise educational goals to adjust our schools, our students
and ourselves to those changing parameters.
To view Zodhiates' clarion call from another angle:
From it we can infer that he regards technology as a neutral
tool that we decide to use or not to use according to
purposes outside of itself. A careful reading of Grant will
prompt the question: But is not the way of thinking that is
central to the dynamic of technology the same as the
reasoning we employ to decide for what purposes we shall use
the technology? In other words, how unencumbered are we in
our choosing when we consider the roles technology will
assume in schools? And what options do we now take for
2 Aside from a few groups such as the Old Order
Mennonites, it would be hard to imagine any school opposing
technology in education on principle.
7granted that technology may destroy in the future if we
allow it to develop along a certain path?
The dynamic logic of technology seems immune to this
type of questioning. For example, one has only to consider
the present ecological crises to recall that pollution-free
air and water as well as an ozone layer thick enough to
protect us from harmful radiation-were once freely enjoyed
in North America. Our response to these crises illustrates
the deeply held faith we have in technology. We design more
effective pollution control devices on cars but do not
seriously question this mode of transportation which has
radically altered the landscape and cityscapes. How long
will it be before most of us, not just those with
respiratory problems, have to carry oxygen tanks? Will all
of us have to buy our drinking water in the future or
install filtration or distillation systems in our homes?"
Even though most of us are aware of how we look to
newer technologies to solve the problems created by older
ones, it is considered heresy to question technology itself.
For example, a synthetic fluorocarbon has been invented to
replace the older refrigerants that have caused so much
damage to the high-altitude ozone. Yet, just as with the
older "freon," we cannot foresee whether or not the
introduction of this new chemical in our environment will
cause a different or more serious ecological effect. The
disaster of DDT has done little to shake our hope in the
8promise of technology.
This thesis is meant to take Zodhiates' suggestion
seriously. It attempts to analyze from a philosophica1 3 or
theoretical perspective the relationship between education
and technology. Grant's writings are examined as the basis
for this analysis in order to understand the grounds for
exercising caution with respect to technological innovation
in education.
Chapter two summarizes the life and work of George
Parkin Grant. Chapter three is an explanation of Grant's
definition of technology. Chapter four is an exposition of
Grant's views on education. John Dewey's position on
technology and education and their relationship is used in
chapter five to critique Grant's ideas. In the final
chapter, the validity of the thesis is assessed in the
context of implications for educational research and
practice.
3 I accept Grant's definition of philosophy as being
"open to the whole" (Grant,. 1989, p. 165). This sounds a bit
pompous and pretentious to those trained in analytical
philosophy. Nevertheless, it is in the spirit of that
definition that I conduct the conceptual analysis.
CHAPTER TWO: GEORGE PARKIN GRANT
Preliminaries
George Parkin Grant was born in Toronto on November 13,
1918. By the time he died on September 27, 1988 in Halifax,
Grant was recognized as one of Canada's foremost political
philosophers. The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint
the reader with the life and work of George Grant to provide
a context for understanding his ideas on technology and
education. The main source for reviewing his life was
Christian's (1993) comprehensive biography. My own reading
of Grant's work was the basis for summarizing his ideas. In
addition, I have incorporated some recollections of Grant as
a teacher based on my experience auditing two courses with
him in 1978-79 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario.
Preliminary to this review of Grant's life and work, it
might be helpful to describe how I developed an interest in
Grant so that the reader.is aware of my bias. During a
second-year political science course taken in 1971-72, a
requirement was to read. Grant's Lament for a Nation (1970).
It was my first exposure to Grant and I became immediately
enthusiastic, for here was a respected intellectual publicly
expressing admiration for former Canadian Prime Minister
J.G. Diefenbaker when it was not popular to do so. My
father had voted for Diefenbaker time and again in the
1960s. Perhaps that partially explains my initial interest
in Grant. In the years that followed, I read everything I
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could by him outside of any course requirements. Soon I
began to suspect that we shared a similar Christian faith.
It was not until my year of teacher training in 1978-79
that I was afforded an opportunity to know him in person
since the Ontario Teacher Education College was situated on
the border of the McMaster campus. My pre-service year
involved no formal classes: It was a flexible,
individualized program where study groups met at their own
convenience. This made it possible to listen to Grant, from
whom I have never taken a course for credit.
George Parkin Grant: Life and Work
George Grant was born into a distinguished Canadian
family with a tradition of service in the field of
education. George Munro Grant, his paternal grandfather,
was instrumental in transforming a small Presbyterian
college into Queen's University at Kingston during his
tenure there as Principal from 1877 until his death in 1902.
His maternal grandfather, Sir George Parkin, had been a
headmaster at two schools: the first in Fredericton, New
Brunswick, the other in Toronto at Ontario's premier private
school for boys -- Upper Canada College. Later, in
recognition for his diplomatic services to the British
Empire, Parkin received the honour of establishing and
administering the Rhodes scholarships from Oxford, England.
George Grant's father, William Lawson Grant, was the first
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Canadian to win a first in Greats (Classics) at Oxford.
After a brief stint as a history professor at Queen's
University, W.L. Grant, like his father-in-law before him,
became headmaster of Upper Canada College. He administered
that school from 1918 until his death in 1935. Although
George Grant later complained that "his whole life was a
convalescence from growing up in a school run by his father"
(Christian, 1993, p. 7), his biographer concludes: "Except
for the last year as a boarder at Upper Canada after his
father died, there is little evidence of the unhappiness he
claims to have endured as a child" (Christian, 1993, p. 20).
George Grant grew up in Toronto during the 1920s and
1930s as the youngest child and only son of William and
Maude Grant. He had three older sisters. His father's
salary as Headmaster at Upper Canada College was
considerable enough for· the family to afford three servants.
Largely through Maude's social skills, the Grants developed
connections with the rich and powerful in Toronto, many of
whom sent their sons to.be educated at Upper Canada College.
George Grant's uncle, Vincent Massey, was Canadian High
Commissioner in England during the Second World War and
later was appointed as the first Canadian-born Governor-
General. Grant had the benefit of connections like these
throughout his life and was often able to draw upon them.
Powerful personalities dominated the Grant-Parkin clan.
It was by "force of personality and hard work" (Christian,
. I
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1993, p. 22) that George Munro Grant had built Queen's. His
father, William, believed that the aim of Upper Canada
College was "the formation of character, and hence he was
less interested in hiring scholars than he was in recruiting
men with powerful personalities" (Christian, 1993, p. 22).
His mother, Maude, who graduated from McGill University in
1903, so impressed Eugene Forsey, a notable Canadian senator
and constitutional expert, that he remarked: "She could have
run the British Empire at the height of its power single-
handed" (Christian, 1993, p. 12). One of the themes of
Christian's biography is that George Grant's mother was a
dominant figure in his life from whom he was always looking
for signs of affection and acceptance. "Only half-jokingly
[Grant] later said that [his mother] expected him to become
prime minister and never forgave him for failing"
(Christian, 1993, p.15).
After completing his elementary and secondary education
at Upper Canada College, Grant attended Queen's University
where he attained a B.A~ in History. He won a Rhodes
Scholarship to study law at Oxford University, England, in
1939. As a result of rubbing shoulders with professors and
students who had been trained in the older classical
tradition in England, he became conscious of his own North
American pragmatism.
Grant had to postpone his studies when the war began.
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As a teenager in Upper Canada College, he had read a book1
which convinced him to be a pacifist. This position was
further strengthened when he beGame aware of his father's
devastating experience as a soldier in World War I
(Christian, 1993, pp. 5,6). Because of his pacifism, Grant
did not join the armed forces. Instead, he trained to serve
as an Air Raid Precautions Warden for the Bermondsey
district of southeast London. It was his job "to make sure
that the blackout was observed and, once a raid was in
progress, to summon the appropriate emergency services,
rescue those trapped in the rubble, provide first aid, and
most dangerous of all, investigate unexploded bombs"
(Christian, 1993, p. 70).
Grant knew firsthand the horror of modern warfare.
Later on, in the 1960s when he opposed the Vietnam War, he
had no trouble sympathizing with the North Vietnamese who
endured the saturation bombing of American B-52s. The
experience of the London "Blitz" led him to begin
questioning the liberal ideal of 'progress because such
"progress" seemed only to have increased the incredible
destructive power that humans could unleash on each other.
Grant wrote to his mother in June 1940 that one bomb could
instantly
destroy even the most intricate, delicately balanced
1 Nichols, B. (1933). Cry havoc. London: Jonathan Cape.
Cited in Christian (1993, p. 28).
'I
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human personality. Not only is the beautiful mechanism
of the body torn, ripped, masticated by the tiger-like
violence of the high explosive, but the existence of
the person knitted with his thoughts, passions,
ambitions, inhibitions is destroyed. (Grant cited by
Christian, 1993, p. 103)
When the German bombing of Britain subsided in 1941,
Grant was no longer needed as an air raid warden. Feeling
he should do something to help in the war, in addition to
being subjected to much pressure from family and friends to
join the armed forces, Grant proceeded to apply to serve in
the least militant branch of the navy -- the merchant
marine. Grant's pacifism seemed to be compromised.
However, in effect, his pacifism was not tested because the
merchant marine rejected his application when his medical
examination revealed a tubercular lesion.
Grant panicked at the news. He tried to board another
ship but was not allowed on. Without telling anyone, Grant
took a job working as a-farm labourer thirty miles from
Oxford. It was here, sometime in mid-December 1941, that
Grant's pivotal conversion to Christianity took place. "For
the rest of his life George Grant attempted to think through
the meaning of this experience" (Christian, 1993, p. 86).
I heard Grant relate this experience in class one
autumn afternoon in 1978. He said that he walked through a
gate early one morning and suddenly realized that he was not
15
his own. This was the only time I had ever heard anyone
describe a conversion experience using words that echo the
first question and answer of the Heidelberg Catechism. 2
Grant gave an informal talk on abort~on in 1975 at a
gathering of students and professors which I attended at
McMaster. Here he used this same phrase in a different
context. It illustrates how foundational his faith was to
his thinking. After Grant had expounded his objections to
the pro-choice abortion position, an angry woman proclaimed,
"This is my body to do with as I choose." After a slight
pause, Grant responded, "I can only say that I believe that
I am not my own."
In early 1942 Grant returned to Canada to rest and
recover from exhaustion. Many thought he was on the brink
of a nervous breakdown. He stayed with his mother in
Toronto and spent most of the year in bed. One friend who
had known him before the war concluded that Grant's
"emotional devastation in the war arose from the fact that
he was entirely on his own, and not insulated by the
discipline and order of the armed forces" (Christian, 1993,
p. 90).
After he had regained his strength and a doctor had
2 Q. What is your only comfort in life and death? A.
That I am not my own, but belong - body and soul, in life and
in death to my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ. (Psalter
Hymnal, 1987, p. 861). This seemed ironic to me because this
catechism is a doctrinal standard of Calvinist Christianity,
a tradition that Grant often criticized.
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pronounced his tubercular lesion inactive, Grant took a job
with the Canadian Association of Adult Education. Part of
his task was to help prepare weekly national radio
broadcasts entitled Citizens' Forum a program designed to
encourage Canadians to think about and discuss political
issues in local groups. Grant hoped these programs and
discussion groups would lead to democratic action:
Discussion is, in fact, intelligent deliberation as to
what is necessary to be done. Action is the putting of
decisions into effect. Discussion, like most thought,
is sterile if it doesn't lead forward to practical
conclusions. Action, to be constructive, must be well
thought out. (Grant, 1944, p. 26)
In 1944 Grant involved himself in two local activist
groups-- two of the relatively few that were initiated by
Citizens' Forum. The Civil Liberties Association of Toronto
launched a campaign to restore the property and civil rights
of Japanese Canadians. The Citizens' Housing Association
was founded to promote publicly financed low-rental housing
(Christian, 1993, p. 101).
In his discussions with fellow workers in adult
education and activist groups, he felt more and more uneasy
with their socialist or liberal stance. He was beginning to
critique modernity and he believed that liberals and social
17
democrats 3 shared the goal of creating well-adjusted
citizens for a democratic society.4 For him this was a
"travesty of education" (Christian, 1993, p. 104).
At the same time, his conversations with fellow
activist Judith Robinson deeply influenced how he viewed
Canada's relationship with the United States. Twenty years
later these views found a mature expression in his most
popular book, Lament for a Nation. During the war and in
the 1950s, a journalist with the Globe and Mail and, later,
the Toronto Telegram, Judith Robinson "consistently
denounced ... the Liberal hegemony in Canadian politics and
the policy of integrating Canada more closely to the United
States" (Christian, 1993, p. 107).
Immediately after the war was over, Grant returned to
Oxford to continue his graduate work with one major change:
He switched from law to theology. While in England, Grant
paid a price for the pacifist stance that he had taken five
years earlier. He was initially offered the position of the
3 Later, Grant made it clear that a true conservative
stance has almost disappeared in North America and that those
who are so labelled share the same goal as liberals or social
democrats except that they do not want to reach the goal as
quickly as their more left-leaning compatriots (Grant, 1970,
pp. 72 -75) .
4 Obviously, ,this does not mean that Grant favoured the
creation of maladjusted citizens for an autocratic society.
As is shown below in chapter four, Grant accused the
progressive educators of lowering the "sights" for educational
excellence to "mere" socialization. Socialization was
necessary for a well-ordered society but, in Grant's view,
education transcended it.
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warden of Hart House, University of Toronto, but when the
Board of Governors considered his candidacy, they felt him
an unsuitable choice to relate to returning war veterans who
would be entering university. However, soon after that fell
through, Grant was encouraged to apply for the philosophy
position at Dalhousie University, Halifax.
His formal qualifications seemed inadequate for the
Dalhousie post. Grant had taken only one philosophy course
as an undergraduate at Queen's, for which he had received a
"B." In addition, his doctoral work was not complete.
However, one anonymous character references recommended him
on the basis of his potential teaching ability and perhaps
this persuaded Dalhousie to offer Grant the job:
On the grounds of scholarship I do not think he
deserves consideration. As a teacher, however, he
would probably be extremely good .... He has also a
most unusual ability in dealing with people and in
appreciating points of view which are not his own.
(Christian, 1993, p. 129)
Before leaving England to take up his first academic
position in Canada, George Grant married Sheila Allen, an
S Christian speculates that the reference might have been
Nathaniel Micklen, an Oxford professor of theology who had
been a friend of the Grant family when he taught in Kingston
from 1927 to 1931 (Christian, 1993, pp. 113, 129). It is
difficult not to presume that Grant's family "pull" helped him
in attaining the Rhodes Scholarship, the post at Dalhousie and
the invitation to write an article for a Royal Commission in
1950 (Armour, 1994, pp. 36-37).
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Oxford graduate in English Literature. She was his
intellectual equal. Christian (1993) provided the following
assessment of Sheila Grant:
She kept her husband more or less sane for over forty
years. She valued his work and actively worked with
him to make it as good as it was. Without her he
undoubtedly would have been a profound thinker, but his
published work would not have been as good. (p. xi)
Grant taught philosophy at Dalhousie University from
1947 until 1960. At first he was the only teacher in the
philosophy department and lacked formal training in this
discipline, so Grant combined a lot of reading with guidance
from someone he befriended at Oxford -- James Doull, a,
classics professor at Dalhousie. Doull was a Hegelian who
helped Grant read through some works of philosophy,
particularly the thought of Kant and Plato. Grant felt a
great debt towards Doull:
I will never forget once, walking down the street in
Halifax, he showed me what the image of the sun in
Plato's Republic meant. Everything that I had been
trying to think came together .... He was the person
who made me really look at Western philosophy.
(Schmidt, 1978, p. 64)
From then on, Plato became a central influence in Grant's
thought as he turned away from the progressivist assumptions
of modernity and looked with increasing favour at ancient
20
Greek philosophy.
Grant was an excellent teacher. Sitting in his class
was like going on an adventure. I felt that the most
critical questions were being considered and I did not want
to miss one point in the-ensuing discussion. Standing in
front of the class, this imposing large figure would look
out at us with a fixed gaze and begin his lecture with a
colourful anecdote before considering a question that had
not been resolved at the last class. He treated students
with respect and humility. Once he said, "For those of you
who go into teaching, you must never forget that when you
walk in front of a classroom of students, there is always at
least one person there who is more intelligent than you
are. ,,6
George Grant attributed his success in teaching to his
thorough preparation, development of clear examples and
stories to illustrate ideas, and "great emotional
concentration at each hour of lecturing" (Christian, 1993,
p. 134). He took his students' questions seriously, and, if
he did not have an immediate answer, took the time to read
and think about it after class before responding to it at
the following session.
In 1949-50, Grant took a leave of absence from
Dalhousie to complete his D. Phil. in theology at Oxford.
6 This is a paraphrase based on my recollections of 1978-
79.
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On returning to Canada, he was asked to write a paper on the
study of philosophy in English Canada for the Royal
Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and
Sciences headed by his uncle, Vincent Massey. Since he was
a junior professor whose formal qualifications in academic
philosophy were less than comprehensive, his peers in the
discipline, especially Fulton Anderson, chairman of the
philosophy department at the University of Toronto, were
understandably annoyed that Grant had been selected for this
task. When the report was published in 1951, Anderson was
enraged by Grant's attack on university departments of
philosophy which Grant, in effect, accused of turning their
backs on the important questions to become analytical errand
boys for the natural sciences. What really angered Anderson
and most of the analytical 7 philosophers was Grant's
unabashed statement that religious faith was central to the
study of philosophy: "The study of philosophy is the
analysis of the traditions of our society and the judgement
of those traditions against our varying intuitions of the
Perfection of God" (Grant, 1951, p. 119).
Anderson held a conference on Canadian philosophy in
late 1951 to demolish Grant's paper. By not defining what
7 At the risk of oversimplification, the difference
between Grant's approach to philosophy and those who are
loosely termed "analytical" can be described as follows:
Modern analytical philosophy concerns itself with analysis --
the separation of the whole into its component parts. Grant's
approach was based on the ancient view -- gazing at the whole.
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he meant by faith, Anderson argued, Grant's recommendations
would lead to the destruction, not the salvation, of
philosophy. Philosophy, he concluded, would be a means to
confusion if it tried to accommodate itself to "the
conflicting doctrinal persuasions which find adherents in
religious denominations and theological faculties"
(Anderson, 1952, p. 4). Grant's reputation among academic
philosophers in English Canada was sorely damaged and as a
result he learned not to speak or write directly about his
faith again: "I knew from that you had to write fairly
indirectly if you wanted to live, particularly in the
academic community" (Christian, 1993, p. 156).
Grant's response to Anderson was certainly indirect.
He published articles (Grant, 1952; 1954a) that attacked
certain positions held by two leading analytical
philosophers: Karl Popper and Bertrand Russell. Grant's
only reference to Anderson was in an article he wrote for
Encyclopedia Canadiana (Grant, 1958). In that article there
is no evidence of the 1951 controversy. Grant complimented
Anderson's department of philosophy at the University of
Toronto for developing "'a tradition of sound scholarship
[that] has prevented Canadian philosophy from being
dominated by the linguistic emphasis that characterizes
contemporary English and American thought" (Grant, 1958, p.
184). In fact, Grant cited the Anderson (1952) symposium as
a major reference for that article. Perhaps this was
23
Grant's way of "doing academic penance" and acknowledging
that his 1951 description of the state of Canadian
philosophy suffered somewhat from historical inaccuracies.
During the 1950s, George Grant became acquainted with
the writings of Simone Weil, a French intellectual who had
died during the war at the age of thirty-three. He was
overwhelmed by the power and clarity of her thought. Weil
had been a Christian Platonist, and she became Grant's most
important intellectual influence. Her definition of faith
as "the experience that the intellect is illuminated by
love"a was a statement that he reflected on for the rest of
his life in his attempts to understand the relationship
between reason and faith.
In 1958, the CBC invited Grant to prepare a series of
radio programs "to inaugurate a new experiment in
educational public broadcasting, a sort of university of the
air" (Christian, 1993, p. 187). In these lectures, which
were published in 1959 9 under the title Philosophy in the
Mass Age, Grant explained the importance and difficulty of
doing philosophy today. He mainly argued that there was
something essential missing in modernity that we need in
order to live well.
At this point in his thought Grant was still publicly
a The meaning of this definition is explicated in chapter
four.
9 The citations that I use from this work are taken from
the second edition published in 1966.
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enthusiastic about the modern notion of "subjective freedom"
which he defined as
freedom of the spirit: man [sic] is more than simply an
object in the world, he [sic] is a subject .... What we
really are can never be an object for ourselves. As
far as action is concerned, this subjectivity implies
the power to stand above ourselves and judge what we
are and what we should be. (Grant, 1966a, pp. 69, 70)
His analysis of Marxism, which was considered
sympathetic given the climate of anti-communism of that
decade, and his musings on existentialism combined with his
opposition to pragmatism and progressive education left the
listeners with a question to which Grant had no answer: Was
it possible to combine the modern good of subjective freedom
with the ancient idea of a transcendent order independent of
human construction that would provide a fitting context for
that freedom?lO These radio broadcasts brought Grant a
measure of recognition.
Throughout the fifties, Grant was looking to teach in
Ontario in order to be closer to "where the action was" and
also to be near his mother in Toronto'. In 1960, he accepted
a position to teach philosophy at York University, a brand-
10 "Freedom so defined is not, then, simply the ability
to get what we want when we want it, but also the ability to
reflect about what we should want. To use the traditional
language of moral philosophy, it also implies that we cannot
find our completeness in any finite object of desire" (Grant,
1966a, p. 70).
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new institution that in its early years was a "satellite" of
the University of Toronto. This meant that the curricula,
exams and textbooks were set by University of Toronto's
philosophy department where Grant's nemesis, Fulton
Anderson, still taught. When Grant realized what- little
freedom he had to structure his own courses and was forced
to use a textbook that, he felt, misrepresented Christianity
and was opposed to classical philosophy, he resigned.
With a wife and six children to support, George Grant
was unemployed. However, he was soon able to procure a
position as a consultant to the Institute for Philosophical
Research based in San Francisco. Grant was allowed to work
out of Toronto where his major task for the year was to read
over fifty recently published books on philosophy and
religion and write a report summarizing them for
Encyclopedia Britannica. "It might well be said that with
this intensive immersion in contemporary philosophical and
religious thought George effectively completed his formal
training as a philosopher begun so casually at Queen's
twenty years before" (Christian, 1993, p. 206).
In 1961, George Grant accepted a position at McMaster
University in Hamilton, Ontario, with the newly-formed
Department of Religion. He wanted to help shape a
department that would not only be a place of scholarship but
a mini-university where students and teachers could "pass to
that which quite transcends scholarship -- namely thought"
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(Christian, 1993, p. 222). Hence, for him, the department
had to avoid the two extremes of objective positivism on the
one hand and religious propaganda on the other. Faculty
members were recruited from those who believed and lived
within the traditions out of which they thought and taught -
Christianity, Judaism, and the eastern religions of India
and China.
Even though Grant (1968) encouraged practising
adherents of particular religions to teach from within those
traditions because they were likely "to have a particular
sympathy for the seriousness of the issues involved" 11 (p.
63), nevertheless, he was very concerned that "the
curriculum must not proceed from the assumption that any
particular religion has a privileged status in the nature of
things" (p. 63). The following personal experience
illustrates his approach:
Once, at a graduate seminar in 1978, Professor Grant
wished to consider various definitions of faith. Since he
made it clear that he found Calvinism somewhat repugnant,
Grant refrained from articulating its faith formulation but
invited those students who were of that tradition to do so.
11 The question arises: What about unbelievers? Grant
held that there was no such thing as an absolute unbeliever.
His foundational assumption was that "some form of religion is
coeval with man [sic]" (Grant, 1968, p. 60). No one lived in
a religious vacuum. Rejection of one religion would
immediately be supplanted wi th an openness to another. Hence,
Grant called modern liberalism a "religious faith" (Grant,
1968, p. 60).
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After some trepidation, I volunteered. The next week was
spent reading a few Dutch Reformed theologians in order to
present the Calvinist definition of faith in as defensible a
way as I could muster. 12
It was a Canadian political crisis in 1963 that spurred
Grant on to write the "classic" of modern Canadian
nationalism, Lament for a Nation (1970). The prime
minister, John Diefenbaker, had to face a vote of non-
confidence in the House of Commons over his government's
refusal to allow American nuclear war-heads on Canadian
soil. His government was defeated as a result, but Grant's
admiration of Diefenbaker's courage to not bow to American
pressure and his anger over Canada's loss of control over
its own foreign policy led Grant to not only analyze the
immediate political situation but also ponder the meaning of
nationhood for Canada within the sweep of modern
technological civilization of which the United States was
the centre. This book has been reprinted a number of times
and, in 1986, it was translated into French under the title
Est-ce la fin du Canada?13 Twenty years after its initial
12 My presentation evoked no response or class discussion.
Feeling very uneasy, I questioned Grant about this privately
after the seminar. He replied, "We Christians should not
disagree in public." Grant's unrelenting criticism of
Calvinism, present throughout his work, has challenged me to
examine more closely the roots of my own tradition.
13 Why did it take so long to be translated into French?
This is another example of the "two solitudes" in Canada.
Grant never presumed to speak about the French-Canadian
experience. Almost all his publications were addressed to
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publication, one of the leading French-Canadian journalists
praised it as a "brilliant analysis of his country-men's
absent-minded or enthusiastic surrender to the neighbouring
empire" (Bissonnette, 1988, p. D2).
Lament for a Nation, which mourned the loss of Canadian
sovereignty and declared this loss inevitable, led those who
read it to become more nationalistic. For example, Grant
was invited by members of the New Left to speak to rallies
of students who were protes'ting the war in Vietnam and
seeking ways to bolster Canadian independence.
By the mid-1960s, Grant was studying two thinkers who
further affected the development of his own thought: Leo
Strauss and Jacques Ellul. Leo Strauss was a Jewish
Platonist who showed Grant the inadequacy of Hegel's
synthesis of ancient and modern thought. Strauss led Grant
to view the culmination of Hegel's modern universal and
homogenous state as tyranny -- perhaps a happy one, but
still as a tyranny. Grant saw this tyranny beginning to
envelop the modern world. As a result, Grant was now even
more firmly turned towards the ancients and away from the
moderns.
Jacques Ellul's book, The Technological Society (1970)
so impressed Grant that he began to use the word
"technology" as the descriptor of what the modern world was
all about. His praise for Ellul's analysis was effusive:
English-speaking Canadians.
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The danger of attempting philosophy is that one can be
so taken up by the difficulties in knowledge of the
whole that one is overcome by a vertigo which
demolishes one's ability to look at the world with
steadiness. This is perhaps the reason why so few
human beings have passed beyond that vertigo to the
state where they are "spectators of all time and
existence." It must have taken immense steadiness and
courage to have maintained unflinchingly one's gaze on
modernity as Ellul has done. (Grant, 1966b, p. 60)
To be a "spectator of all time and existence" was the
ancient quest of philosophy, but this is considered an
illusion by those who consciously or unconsciously accept
the assumptions of historicism. A historicist believes that
thought cannot transcend a particular historical epoch.
That we are beings of a certain time and place and that we
cannot really know anything beyond the existential moment is
a tenet widely held by moderns. Through one of his
children, Grant began to read Nietzsche, a nineteenth-
century historicist philosopher whom Grant regarded as the
founder of existentialism.
In 1969, Grant gave the Massey Lectures in which he
reflected on and responded to Nietzsche's conception of
"time as history." Here Grant confronted the modern thinker
who argued the historicist position in a powerfully,
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persuasive way. Nietzsche attacked Christianity and
Platonism at their roots and pronounced their so-called
claim to permanent truth as ultimate delusion. Grant viewed
Weber, Freud, and Sartre as derivative thinkers of this man.
Long before them, Nietzsche invented the language of values,
understood humans essentially as "ids" and posited the
finality of becoming. Grant did not (and felt he could not)
mount a proper rebuttal of Nietzsche's historicism.
Instead, we have a clear and dramatic portrayal of a great
thinker with Grant prodding us to a whispered question: Are
we sure that this is all there is?
These lectures, entitled Time as History, were delayed
in published form because George and Sheila Grant suffered
injuries in an automobile accident while on holiday in
Barbados in 1970. In addition, Grant published Technology
and Empire (1969a), which was a collection of essays he had
written between 1963 and 1969. In this volume, one sees
Grant's beginning reflections on the meaning of technology.
In early 1974, George Grant gave the Wood lectures at
Mount Allison University at the invitation of his friend
Alex Colville the "magic realist" painter whose art echoes
the ancient Greek fascination with mathematical forms. In
these lectures, Grant analyzed the liberal idea of justice,
taking as his starting point John Rawls' A Theory of Justice
and ending with a reflection of what justice meant in the
light of the Roe v. Wade decision on abortion. The
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publication of these lectures, English-Speaking Justice
(1974), was the first of his books to be simultaneously
published in an American edition.
In the 1970s, the Department of Religion at McMaster
had changed from what Grant had originally envisioned it to
be. It was being increasingly dominated by the type of
technical scholarship which Grant felt was ignoring the
basic issues in philosophy and religion with which students
needed to wrestle. Grant fought many battles within the
department to prevent this, but it was a lost cause. Grant
actually began to discourage some graduate students from
pursuing the study of philosophy. As a former graduate
student explained:
What Grant was saying amounted to this: studying
philosophy is impractical and can hurt your career. It
was the last thing I expected to hear from him. We had
just been discussing truth, faith, madness, and
abysses, and he wanted to change the topic and discuss
careers! (Field, 1993, p. 222)
Research grants were funnelled towards those in the
department who wished to establish McMaster as "a major
centre for historical biblical scholarship" (Christian,
1993, p. 318). To Grant, the balance in the religion
department had tipped towards scholarship and away from
thought. It was time to leave.
Dalhousie offered him a post which he accepted. He
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left McMaster in 1980 in a cloud of controversy because of
an interview he gave to a journalist explaining his reasons
for leaving. In the Hamilton Spectator, Grant was quoted as
saying that:
The stress at McMaster has gone too heavily in favour
of research .... Research is appropriate for the
sciences and medicine but there are numerous
philosophical questions which can never be solved but
only illuminated anew by teaching and debate .... What
is justice is different from what is a nucleus. (Van
Harten, 1980, p.7)
The Globe and Mail picked up the story in which questions
were raised about McMaster in particular and the role of
teaching and research in general ("The Bothersome Students,"
1980) .
In 1983, George Grant retired. He spent the remaining
years of his life reading and writing and was hoping some
day to write a definitive response to Nietzsche and
Heidegger. This was not to be. Instead, he published his
last collection of essays, Technology and Justice, in 1986,
two years before he died of pancreatic cancer. He is buried
at Terrance Bay, Nova Scotia. On his tombstone is inscribed
an aphorism of St. Augustine which best sums up the quest of
this "classical modern": Out of the shadows and imaginings
into the truth.
Technology was one of the major themes of George
Grant's reflections. In the next chapter, this theme is
traced over the course of his writings as his concept of
technology is analyzed.
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CHAPTER THREE: KNOWING AND MAKING: GEORGE GRANT'S CONCEPT OF
TECHNOLOGY
How have the universities failed in the past? They
have been dogged by specialization and departmentalism
so that each little segment of knowledge, cut off from
the rest of knowledge, has been as colourless and
unproductive as grass under a stone. Universities have
served to produce techniques and technicians rather
than sane ideas and thinking citizens. (Grant, 1943, p.
20 )
The above quotation is one of the earliest published
examples of George Grant's lifelong concern for the effect
of technology on education. Here, at the age of twenty-
four, Grant was aware of what he later would characterize as
the "multiversities" -- what universities were becoming as a
result of increasing specialization. It is obvious that he
deplored this development and that universities have somehow
"lowered their sights" by encouraging the learning of
techniques at the expense of thinking about "sane" ideas.
(What Grant meant by "sane ideas" is explored in the next
cha~ter.) The quotation also implies that thinking citizens
are at least as important to a society as competent
technicians. Grant never wavered from this position.
Almost forty years after he wrote the above in a book
review, Grant resigned his position at McMaster University
because he had failed to prevent technical scholarship from
'I
I
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overtaking in what, in his opinion, was the university's
primary aim: to guide and challenge students to think about
the major questions.
To understand Grant's position, one needs to know his
concept of technology, his theory of education and how he
related the two. In this chapter, his view of technology
will be explicated. The next chapter will concentrate on
Grant's theory of education, followed by a discussion on how
he perceived technology as a threat to that theory.
Grant's concept of technology evolved over the course
of his thought. Until the 1960s his reflections did not
include a definition. Jacques Ellul was pivotal in
persuading Grant to focus on the idea of "technique."
Although, in Grant's estimation, Ellul had formulated an
excellent practical definition, Grant wanted to uncover the
meaning of the concept in a deeper, theoretical way. Using
Martin Heidegger's work as a guide, Grant finally defined
"technology" in his own terms.
Research Method
A conceptual analysis of Grant's use of "technique" and
"technology" is performed in the following manner: First,
his writings before 1965 on the theme of technology are
examined, and, based on that examination, an explicit
definition of his implied use of that concept is attempted.
Second, Ellul's definition of technique as elaborated in his
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book The Technological Society (1970) is reviewed. Third,
Grant's use and critique of Ellul's definition in his
writings between 1965 and 1973 are analyzed. Fourth,
Grant's own definition of technology as he developed it
after 1974 will be explained.
Almost all of Grant's works are available at the
McMaster University Library.l I selected approximately
forty of his writings for research. Two of his books,
Technology and Empire (1969a) and Technology and Justice
(1986a) are collections of essays, many of which had
appeared previously in journals. His monographs, Philosophy
in the Mass Age (1966a), Lament for a Nation (1970), Time as
History (1969b) and English-Speaking Justice (1974) are slim
volumes rarely exceeding 100 pages in length. Grant's most
lengthy writing is his unpublished D.Phil. 'thesis (1950), a
copy of which McMaster was able to obtain in 1992.
Writing was a difficult task for George Grant. (His
wife, Sheila, was a silent but active partner in his written
work). Grant cast a suspicious eye on the ideas of those
academics who wrote prolifically, not only because his own
disposition was not so inclined, but also because he
believed that much careful reading and thought had to
precede anything that was worth writing. Once, in class,
1 I was assisted by a comprehensive bibliography of
Grant's works that is appended to George Grant: A Biography
(Christian, 1993, pp. 450-460). It was prepared by K. Mark
Haslett, a librarian at McMaster. Grant's publications span
the years 1933 to 1991.
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Grant expressed his exasperation that Jacques Ellul had
produced yet another book. By the time this French
sociologist and Reformed theologian died in 1994, it was
estimated that he had written over 40 books and 1,500
articles2 •.
Grant's elegant writing is densely packed: His style is
almost poetic. (Dennis Lee, a Canadian poet, loved to read
him.) But, like poetry, it can be difficult to comprehend
quickly. I agree with Field (1993, pp. 216-217) that
Grant's writing bears re-reading very well.
Since Grant often employed subtlety and irony, he was
often misunderstood (Umar, 1992, p. 151). Another
difficulty for those who wish to comprehend his position in
philosophy was that he saw his role as that of negating
modern theories that he believed were inadequate. Grant's
comment about John Oman, the subject of his D. Phil. thesis,
could be equally applied to himself: "Often what he himself
asserts is described in a few cryptic sentences after a
detailed and lucid criticism of other positions" (Grant,
1950, p. 30). Even though Grant's admiration for the
ancient thinker Plato was evident, he never produced a
commentary on any of the dialogues. Simone Weil was his
modern lodestar, but he published only one article about her
2 Grant's critical view of John Calvin implies a
rejection of the idea of creative writing. "Do you know what
Hooker said about Calvin? 'He learnt by writing and not by
reading'" (Grant, 1985a, p. 43)
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near the end of his life. Yet, even this short piece was an
angry reaction to what someone else had written regarding
Weil (Grant, 1989, p. 165).
1943-1964: Technology in the Background
As noted in the introduction, Grant's comments about
techniques and technicians in a 1943 book review revealed
his disdain for their encroachment on the proper role of a
university. However, he did not define technique;
technology was not his focus at that time.
Nowhere in his D. Phil. thesis (1950) did Grant refer
to technology. Yet, in his study of John Oman can be found
the basis of ideas that reappear later in Grant's direct
study of technology. His thesis examined the concept of
nature and supernature in Oman's th~ology.
For John Oman, a Scottish theologian of the early
twentieth century, the way humans experience nature was the
basis for properly understanding nature. Nature~ in this
case, refers to the natural environment that has not been
altered much by human activity.
Oman feared that industrialism would deprive humans of
"the vision of nature in any terms save that of the tourist
resort" (Grant, 1950, p. 90). Similarly, Heidegger (1977)
reflected on how modern technology had shaped our perception
of nature: "The Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is
it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an
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object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there
by the vacation industry" (p. 16).
Oman isolated four ways in which humans experience
nature. First, there is awareness of the whole field.
Second, apprehension occurs when one element in the field is
brought into focus. Oman called these two activities
perceiving nature because the "mind is engaged mainly in the
contemplation by feeling of the objects as they are in
themselves" 3 (Grant, 1950, p. 89). The third way of
experiencing nature is comprehension (i.e., one understands
what is happening with one element in the field). The
fourth way, explanation, results as one seeks to understand
a part of an element according to a principle.
Oman illustrated these four ways by describing a
person's experience of standing on the edge of a country
road. First, he or she is aware of the whole field: the
cool fog, the aroma of cut hay, the shadowy trees, the early
morning silence. Second, the person apprehends a man on a
bicycle coming closer. 4 Third, he or she comprehends the
bicycle as a means of transportation. Fourth, if the person
seeks to understand how the man can keep his balance
3 Seeing things "as they are in themselves" became
Grant's philosophic passion. This unmodern idea has its roots
in Plato's ontology which is reviewed in chapter four.
4 Why "apprehend" the bicycle and not the bird chirping
in the tree? The issues raised by Oman's theory of experience
go beyond the scope of this chapter. My purpose here is to
sketch those ideas of Oman which help clarify Grant's evolving
notion of technology.
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on two wheels, he or she will end up in explanation.
The third and fourth ways of experiencing nature are
called using nature by Oman. That is, "our interest is in
manipulating the objects for our own free purposes" (Grant,
1950, p. 89). It is this idea of "using nature" to which
Grant returned later in order to depict the spirit of
technology.
For Oman, our experience of nature is skewed if the
principles of explanation derived from using nature are
employed in perceiving nature. Oman illustrated: Once we
have discovered the principle of a lever in a solid piece of
wood, everything else about the wood recedes from view
except those properties of rigidity and strength that relate
to our use of the-wood as a lever. We move from awareness
and apprehension of the wood towards comprehensi'on and
explanation so that the principle of the lever is abstracted
from our original experience. This is all well and good,
but, cautioned Oman, "this does not justify reversing the
process so that, instead of the principle being formulated
out of experience, experience is formulated out of it, till
it becomes like the interpretation of the forest by a sawyer
in terms of planks" (Grant, 1950, p. 139).
Oman's concern about the relationship between
perceiving nature and using nature hinted at the direction
of modern science which Grant would later characterize-as
-technological:
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Men proud of their ability to control nature, equated
knowledge of nature with control of it. Philosophers
of this period [post Renaissance] conceived nature from
inference based on the ability to control it by
explanations . . Men so taken up became blinded to
the witness of nature in feeling which is the
foundation of all other relations to nature. (Grant,
1950, p. 90)
One is tempted to dismiss Oman and Grant as
"romantics," but it is outside of my purpose to explicate
what Oman meant by "feeling."s The point is that Grant's
final formulation of the term "technology" incorporated
Oman's sense of using, controlling or manipulating nature.
Whether this was a conscious or unconscious influence is
hard to determine because Grant nowhere acknowledges such a
debt.
This is not to imply that Grant was a poor scholar. He
graciously acknowledged those whose thought hoe admired.
Rather, Grant's public silence on Oman can perhaps be
explained as part of the strategy he adopted after 1951 to
write indirectly about matters pertaining to the
"supernatural." After all, Oman was a theologian, Grant's
D. Phil. was in theology and the public intellectual climate
S Oman defines feeling as an activity where one responds
justly and completely to one's environment. It is a
"sensitiveness" where one's senses are keen and active; where
one's whole being is alert to appreciate all of the
environment (Grant, 1950, pp. 62-63).
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of his day did not encourage serious theological reflection
as he found out when the Massey Commission published his
report (1951).
In that controversial report "Philosophy" (Grant,
1951), there was a section worth quoting in full that
demonstrated his continuing concern about techniques:
Can it be doubted that Canadian universities exist
essentially as technical schools for the training of
specialists? . These technicians are not called
upon in any systematic way to relate their necessary
techniques to any broader whole. Even the traditional
humane subjects such as history, the classics and
European literature are in many cases being taught as
techniques by which [the student] can hope to earn his
living, not as useful introductions to the sweep of our
spiritual tradition. . Philosophy is not in essence
a technique. Its purpose is to relate and see in unity
all techniques, so that the physicist for instance, can
relate his activity to the fact of moral freedom, the
economist see the productive capacity of his nation in
relation to the Love of God. (Grant, 1951, pp. 119-120)
My purpose in analyzing the above is not to discuss
what Grant meant by philosophy and how it is related to the
"Love of God," but rather to uncover his implicit
understanding of technique. First, he did not dispute the
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necessity of learning techniques at the university level"
but that students need a place at that level to seriously
consider and question the purposes of those techniques.
This activity Grant called philosophy, which, in his view,
was not a technique. Second, it is obvious that what Grant
meant by technique was not limited to machinery, engineering
or the applied sciences. He implied that it is an activity
found in "pure" science (physics) as well as social science
(economics). Further, it is even found in the humanities.
At another place in the 1951 report, technique was
mentioned. Here he attacked pragmatism and positivism:
What do such positions mean but that ideas are true
insofar as they help men manipulate their natural
environment? Along with Marxism. . they tend toward
the position that all men's problems may be solved by
scientific technique. (Grant, 1951, p. 122)
In the above, the idea presented in Grant's thesis
(1950)' -- the manipul~tion of nature -- was associated with
technique. Another implication was that the exaltation of
technique is shared by major modern philosophies or
ideologies.
What, at this point in the analysis, would be a working
definition of Grant's concept of technique? A technique is
an activity -- practical or intellectual that has within
it a manipulative stance towards nature. Although it may be
an intellectual activity, it is not the highest one (this is
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philosophy). Yet, it is gaining status as such across some
major modern intellectual movements.
In "Adult Education and the Expanding Economy," Grant
(1954b) resumed his theme of technology versus education.
The following quotation is consistent with the definition
above. In it, Grant expressed his awareness of society's
domination by technology. He labelled the "inescapable
situation within which we work and have our being" (Grant,
1954b, p. 4) as the expanding economy defined as "a society
which holds that the control of nature by technology is the
chief purpose of human existence and so from that belief a
community is built where all else is subordinated to that
purpose" (Grant, 1954b, p. 4).
In "The Minds of Men in the Atomic Age," (1985b) first
published in 1955, Grant replaced the label "expanding
economy" with "mass scientific society." It was written at
a time when people were acutely aware of the possibility of
global nuclear destruction. Yet Grant was fearful of
something that he considered to be worse: "I can imagine a
prosperous society, without war, of healthy animals adjusted
to worshipping their machines which would be so disgusting
that one could will that it should be destroyed" (Grant,
1985b, p. 284).
However, society had not yet reached that stage. He
was still, at this point, hopeful about human excellence.
For Grant there never was a doubt about the benefits of
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technology:
Indeed at the profoundest level we must welcome the
mass scientific society, despite all its horrors. For
it has put us in a new relation to nature. We can now
as never before choose to make our world, to use nature
and to abuse her, but less than ever before need we
submit to her as necessity. For instance, with
advances in co-ntraception chastity is less motivated by
fear and becomes an open decision of the spirit.
(Grant, 1985b, p. 285)
Thirty years later, Grant commented on this stage of
his thought and noted that he had described freedom using
existentialist language -- a language he no longer used6
(Grant, 1990, p. 16). Yet Grant never sought to escape the
modern situation into some romantic view of the past. The
conclusion of his 1955 essay supported this and in it Grant
hoped that we could yet shape our society to nobler ends:
Of course, this is not to say that we can or should
turn back from the technological society. What I am
saying is that the great job in Canada now does not lie
in further economic expansion and quantitative
6 In 1955, Grant had not yet read Leo Strauss whose
influence later spurred Grant's developing critique of the
assumptions of modernity. Near the end of his life Grant
defined freedom as "the liberty to be indifferent to good.
This is of course a quite different use of the word from the
authentic 'freedom' of modern existentialism which at its
heart is an expression of heroic atheism" (Grant, 1990, p.
17) .
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progress, but in trying to bring quality and beauty of
existence into that technological world -- to try and
make it a place where richness of life may be
discovered. (Grant, 1985b, p. 289)
In an essay first published in 1956, Grant reflected on
the meanings of freedom. He criticized a debased form of
it, namely, the ability of a person to get what he or she
wants. (Lotto 649 -- Imagine the freedom!) The following
selection implies a necessary connection between that view
of freedom and techniques applied to human relationships:
It is hardly necessary to mention what the end result
of a manipulative view of freedom must be on personal
relations. The substitution of manipulation for
contemplation turns other people into objects instead
of subjects like ourselves. The loss of adoration of
the other must here be most seriously corrupting. Mr.
and Mrs. Dale Carnegie may be but parodies of the
personnel officer and the practical psychologist, but
the popularity of their techniques among the simpler
success-seekers must not be forgotten. (Grant, 1993, p.
196)
Philosophy in the Mass Age (1966a), originally
published in 1959, can be read as a cogent summary of
Grant's thought of the preceding decade. Again, technology
was addressed only obliquely since Grant's aim in these
radio talks was to prod Canadian citizens to reflect on the
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proper ends of society -- to engage in philosophy at a time
when the mass society was making obscure what those proper
ends were. In a preface added later, Grant evaluated his
hopes:
The book is . permeated with the faith that human
society for all its pain and ambiguities is somehow to
be seen as the progressive incarnation of reason. What
had been lost in the immediacy of the North American
technological drive would be regained, and regained at
a higher level because of the leisure made possible by
technology. (Grant, 1966a, p. vi)
That Grant still felt hopeful about social reform could
be seen in his 1961 involvement with socialists who were
articulating the theoretical basis for the fledgling New
Democratic Party. In his contribution to Social Purpose for
Canada (1961, pp. 3-26), Grant attacked the capitalist ethos
and challenged socialists "to have a profound view of human
good as society's most pressing problems become less simply
quantitative and begin to involve qualitative distinctions"
(p. 13). Socialists need to transform their criticisms of
capitalism into proposals for change not only as "a set of
specific economic and political techniques but as a higher
conception of well-being -- that is, as a morality" (Grant,
1961, p. 16).7
7 Grant would, no doubt, view the Ontario New Democratic
government's policy of running gambling casinos as a
confirmation of his decision to reject socialism in the early
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To review Grant's concept of technology as implied in
the pre-1965 writings: A technique is an activity --
practical or intellectual -- that is oriented towards
manipulation. It can be used for good or ill, but it is our
responsibility to· choose to use it for ends which can be
discussed and decided by people in a democracy through an
activity like philosophy which is in essence not a
technique. Grant warned about the tendency in modern
societies to elevate technique to an unquestioned status,
but was optimistic that we could properly adjust our
priorities and take control of technology before it mastered
us.
After reading Jacques Ellul, Grant looked back at that
time and realized that even as late as 1963, he "did not
grasp what the technological society really is" (Grant,
1969a, p. 43).
Technique: The Definition of Jacques Ellul
The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul (1970) was
originally published in French in 1954. Ellul, a former
resistance fighter of the French underground during World
War II, began his intellectual career as a Marxist. By the
end of the war, he had converted to Christianity. He taught
for many years at the University of Bordeaux. The
sixties. He had concluded by 1963 that the type of morality
he meant had no essential place in the progressivist spirit of
socialism (Christian, 1993, p. 214; p. 241).
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Technological Society is his most well-known work and is
considered compulsory reading for anyone who enters the
contemporary debate concerning the impact of technology on
society. Grant read the 1964 English translation and it
immediately re-oriented his thinking. In an address to a
student rally organized by the New Left in Toronto one year
later, Grant directly cited Ellul (Grant, 1965, p. 4). His
hopes about reforming technological society were muted:
"What I do not see is why anybody should believe that by
some dialectical process of history there should suddenly
spring out of this technological society a free and humane
society" (Grant, 1965, p. 4).
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the preceding
statement shows the combined influence of Jacques Ellul a~d
Leo Strauss. Grant began to read Strauss in 1960 after
completing Philosophy in the Mass Age (Schmidt, 1978, p.
65). Leo Strauss, a German Jew, sought refuge in the United
States when the Nazis gained power in his own country. A
Platonist, he taught political philosophy at the University
of Chicago. B
By 1964 Grant was convinced by Strauss that Hegel's
ideal of a universal and homogeneous state would result in a
B Thoughts on Machiavelli by Strauss (1958) is a
controversial interpretation of this Renaissance thinker. In
the "Introduction to Educational Administration" course at
Brock (July, 1992) Machiavelli's The Prince was on the
syllabus but, much to my disappointment, the substance of this
book was never discussed in class.
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tyranny and that Hegel's masterful attempt to synthesize
ancient and modern philosophy had failed to incorporate what
was true in the ancient Greek account (Grant, 1969a, pp. 81-
109). In Philosophy in the Mass Age Grant had left open the
question whether the "dialectical process of history" would
lead to a free society; now he could not see that
possibility.
How does Ellul define technique? First of all, the
English use of the word "technology" is problematic (Ellul,
1990, p. xv). In French, "technique" refers to the
phenomenon; "technologie" is the study of it. In English,
"technology," like the word "history," is used to denote the
study of something with the thing itself. Grant accepted
that distinction and used "technique" in this way for
approximately seven years. 9 Ellul defined technique as
"the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having
absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in
·every field of human activity" (Ellul, 1970, p. xxv). The
Technological Society is a comprehensive, thorough
elaboration of that definition. In the years since he first
formulated it, Ellul has not modified that concept (Ellul,
1990, p. xii).
By putting methods at the core of the definition, Ellul
was clear that this includes but goes well beyond a
9 A 1971 article is his last published acceptance of
using "technique." A 1974 book is his first consistent use of
"technology" (Grant, 1971, p. 85; 1974, p. 1).
i
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commonsense understanding that equates technique with its
artifacts, such as machines or tangible inventions.
Wherever there are human aims and objectives, there are
methods employed to realize them. This is not new.
Techniques understood as methods have always existed in
cultures. What makes modern technique radically different
is that these methods are rationally arrived at and are
oriented towards absolute efficiency.
Rationality and efficiency did not dominate pre-1700
societies as they do today. The moral and aesthetic
dimensions of a particular culture, combined with the
personality of a toolmaker, expressed themselves in
artifacts that were diverse in form and appearance. For
instance, Ellul noted that swords used by Swiss soldiers in
the sixteenth century had at least nine different forms -- a
reflection of the various modes of fabrication peculiar to
the blacksmith (Ellul, 1970, p. 72). In addition, aesthetic
considerations were such that these old implements would
appear unnecessarily ornate to modern eyes. In the past,
Ellul remarked, "it was impossible to conceive of a tool
that was not beautiful. As for the idea, frequently
accepted since the triumph of efficiency, that the beautiful
is that which is well adapted to use -- assuredly no such
notion guided the aesthetic searchings of the past" (1970,
p. 72).
Ellul nowhere stated what he meant by the adjective
i
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"rational." However, his use of rational is more clear in
what can be described as a restatement of his definition:
When everything has been measured and calculated
mathematically so that the method which has been
decided upon is satisfactory from the rational point of
view, and when, from the practical point of view, the
method is manifestly the most efficient of all those
hitherto employed or those in competition with it, then
the technical movement becomes self-directing. (Ellul,
19 70, pp. 79 - 8 0 )
Ellul's use of rational evokes a type of reasoning based on
calculation.
The above citation also introduces the autonomy of
technique -- something which Grant considered the most
important part of the book (Grant, 1966b, p. 59). By
autonomy of technique, Ellul meant that it is independent of
anything external to itself, including human purposes. All
other spheres in society -- politics, economics, education,
religion, etc., -- have no power in altering technique
outside of the rational and efficient. Ellul stressed
repeatedly that the fact that technique is independent of
moral ends does not prove its neutrality, but rather the
reverse: Technique is its own morality and any moral residue
from the past that impedes its progress is swept away
(Ellul, 1970, p. 134). In philosophical te~s this can be
posited in the following remark attributed to Heidegger:
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Technique is the metaphysic, the ontology of the age (Grant,
1970, p. ix).
Using a sociological rather than a philosophical
approach, Ellul's book described how.technique dominates
modern societies. The first two chapters delineated the
general contours of technique in a historical perspective.
Chapter three discussed the relationship between technique
and the economy. Chapter four analyzed technique and the
state. In chapter five, Ellul explored the area of human
techniques, the purposes of which are to adapt humans to the
necessities of the technical phenomenon. The final chapter
envisioned a future where, if present trends continue, we
would all live "happily" in the most complete dictatorship.
In response to critics who accused him of pessimistic
determinism, Ellul stated in the 1964 preface that his
gloomy forecast would be invalidated if enough people become
aware of the situation and "assert their freedom by
upsetting the course of this evolution" (1970, p. xxx).
One last point about Ellul's analysis: At the risk of
prejudicing the issue and closing down on the inquiry (Is
technology a threat to education?), it is appropriate to
briefly consider how Ellul identified technique with
"progressive education" (1970, pp. 344-349). On the
surface, these techniques are much more humane than the
brutality that characterized much of the traditional
schooling. Progressive education seems to have the highest
54
respect for the individual child; Ellul did not belittle
this. However, like Grant, he concluded that the most
important aim of this movement is social adaptation:
This means that despite all the pretentious talk about
the aims of education -- it is not the child in and for
himself [sic] who is being educated, but the child in
and for society. And the society, moreover is not an
ideal one, with full justice and truth, but society as
it is. (Ellul, 1970, p. 348)
Just as Grant complained about the direction of Canadian
universities, so Ellul observed that education in France is
increasingly oriented towards the goal of producing
technicians:
The intelligentsia will no longer be a model, a
conscience, or an animating intellectual spirit for the
group, even in the sense of performing a critical
function. They will be servants, the most conformist
imaginable, of the instruments of technique. (Ellul,
1970, p. 349)
Taken out of context, Ellul's warnings seem shrill and
tiresome. However, according to the social systems model
for schools, efficiency in an organization is measured by
how well an individual's expected behaviour conforms with
his or her own work needs and motives so as to produce job
satisfaction (Hoy & Miskel, 1991, pp. 43-44). Ellul's point
is that a school system that centers on a child's "needs"
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and "motives" is serving that long-term goal of efficiency
in some present or future social organization. Carl Rogers
(1983), an advocate of a similar non-directive model of
schooling, described the outcome of such an education as "a
fully functioning person [who] not only experiences, but
utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he [sic]
spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills
that which is absolutely determined" (p. 270).
Grant's only criticism of The Technological Society was
the historical outline of the development of technique.
Ellul did not answer an important question for Grant: Why
did technique arise in Western Europe (Grant, 1966b, p. 60)?
Ellul focused his gaze at what Grant calls the
practical level (i.e., the immediacies of all of us as we
experience life in modern society). Without losing this
sense of our daily experiences, 'Grant sought to understand
technique at the theoretical level, that is, what did the
most able thinkers -- whether they be philosophers,
sociologists, historian~, or natural scientists -- write in
the past and in the present which can help explain the
origins of the technological society? As a Platonist, Grant
believed that theories had great practical effect: He
rejected the Marxist (and historicist) position that ideas
are ultimately shaped by economic and other material
circumstances. As he saw it, the way he could contribute in
invalidating Ellul's forecast was to understand the essence
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of technology -- what is at its core. This was no ivory-
tower speculation, for in his view "theories are at work in
the decisions of the world, and we had better understand
them"lO (Grant, 1974, p. 50).
At around 1967 Grant began to seriously read the
writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Grant
had read Nietzsche's Zarathustra in 1939. He was motivated
to do a serious study because of the effect this German
thinker had on Grant's own son. By this time as well,
Heidegger's The Question Concerning Technology (1977) was
available in English. Grant had become acquainted with
Heidegger in the 1950s (Christian, 1993, p. 61; p. 268).
Grant found that both these philosophers had thought deeply
about the nature of modern technological society. For
Grant, these thinkers went together: "It is unthinkable that
Heidegger would have been without Nietzsche" (Schmidt, 1978,
p. 66). Grant's reflections on technology between 1965 and
1973 can be viewed as engaging both these thinkers as he
used Ellul's definition as a jumping off point in
understanding how technique had come to its fullest
expression in North America.
10 Although he was sympathetic to the Marxist critique of
capitalism, Grant rejected philosophical materialism. For him
people acted on the basis of what ideas they believed made
sense to them. His acceptance of Plato's ontology is
discussed in chapter four.
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1965-1973: Technique in North America: Grant's Critique of
Ellul
During the nine years after reading Ellul, Grant
applied his definition of technique to the North American
context. Lament for a Nation (1970) is a musing on the
disappearance of Canada as a sovereign nation through the
dissolving action of technique as it radiated out from its
most advanced expression in the United States. The fragile
traditional conservatism that initially found root in a
Canada determined to exist despite its brash cousin to the
south had no chance in the path of the technological
juggernaut. Grant brilliantly combined the drama of
Diefenbaker's fall with a concise articulation of political
philosophy. Unlike Ellul, he saw an aim external to
technique that was there shaping it in Napoleonic Europe as
the ideal revealed by Hegel: the universal and homogeneous
state.
From Ellul, one gets the impression that technique is
this vast impersonal fo~ce that in some mysterious way is
making slaves of us all through the incontestable majestic
power of calculative reason directed towards absolute
efficiency. Although Ellul's powers of description and
logic convince us that we certainly experience this
impersonal technical necessity on a day-to-day level as we
travel on congested freeways and interact with complex
bureaucracies, nevertheless, one is left with a sense of
, I
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paralysis combined with a feeling of incredulity that this
autonomous technique just is. Grant's philosophical
interest leads to an understanding of how this prodigious
technical phenomenon is our fate. In this sense, Grant
seems more of a humanist11 than Ellul. This is clear in
Grant's use of the word fate:
In our day, necessity is often associated with some
fate in the atoms or the "life force." But historical
necessity is chiefly concerned with what the most
influential souls have thought about human good.
Political philosophy is not some pleasant cultural game
reserved for those too impotent for practice. It is
concerned with judgements about goodness. As these
judgments are apprehended and acted on by practical
men, they become the unfolding of fate. (Grant, 1970,
p. 94)
In thinking about the North American political fate,
Grant believed that there was an "inevitable relation
between dynamic technology and imperialism" (1969a, p. 72).
Since technology was oriented towards the development of a
universal state, any society that was propelled by this
dynamo would be imperialistic. Since the United States
embodies the unfolding of technique in its fullest form,
11 I define a humanist as someone who believes that a
human being cannot essentially be explained or reduced in
reference to non-human terms. For instance, according to this
definition, a person who believes that humans are essentially
sophisticated systems of chemical reactions is not a humanist.
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Grant attached the scandalous label "empire" to this horne of
self-conscious democratic ideals. The Vietnam War, for him
and many others, was proof the United States was the centre
of an empire, and that Canada was a junior member (Grant,
1969a, pp. 63-78).
Grant called his essay "In Defense of North Anlerica"
(1969a, pp. 15-40), an implicit criticism of Ellul's
definition (1969a, p. 11). Here Grant's humanism is evident
(a source of optimism), but he gave technique a broader
scope than Ellul (a source of pessimism). More than Ellul,
Grant emphasized that technique is at the core of who we
are:
Western technical achievement is not simply
external to us .... It moulds us in what we are, not
only at the heart of our animality in the propagation
and continuance of our species, but in our actions and
thoughts and imaginings. (1969a, p. 15)
Yet technique derives its power from human ideas, commitment
and energy. Grant's essay traced the history of technique
in North America. Since the United States is the first
society to have no memory from before the age of progress,
technique could flourish there because of few moral
encumbrances from ancient traditions.
"The meeting of the alien yet conquerable land with
English-speaking Protestants" (Grant, 1969a, p. 19) was the
primal that shaped North Americans. Those Calvinists shared
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with the new Baconian scientists a rejection of medieval
Aristotelianism. Hence, they were open to the discoveries
of those sciences. The pragmatic determination of those
early Calvinists to build a new society with an openness to
using the new sciences for that purpose, created the initial
drive behind technique. As this Calvinism became
secularized, the drive remained as the liberal idea of
progress:
Those uncontemplative and unflinching wills without
which technological society cannot exist, were shaped
from the crucible of a pioneering protestant
liberalism. i(Grant, 1969a, p. 25)
What makes the drive to technology so strong is that it
is carried on by them who still identify what they are
doing with the liberation of mankind. (Grant, 1969a, p.
27 )
The opening sentence in "A Platitude" expressed Grant's
awareness of the difficulty in evaluating technique, once it
is understood as located within us:· "We can hold in our
minds the enormous benefits of technological society, but we
cannot so easily hold the ways it may have deprived us,
because technique is ourselves" (Grant, 1969a, p. 137).
Grant's changed understanding of technique showed the
influence of Nietzsche, who pushed the envelope of a radical
historicism to its limit by declaring that there is no
meaning outside of that which we create: "Technique comes
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forth from and is sustained in our vision of ourselves as
creative freedom, making ourselves, and conquering the
chances of an indifferent world" (Grant, 1969a, p. 137).
In Time as History (1969b), Grant continued his quest
to get at the essence of technology. As Ellul avoided
philosophy and limited his scope to the relative immediacies
of sociology, so Grant turned away from sociology towards
philosophy. "It is not about the multiform predictable
behaviours of modern technical society that I wish to write.
It is about the animating source from which these behaviours
come forth" (1969b, p. 8).
A large part of the animating source for technique is
the modern understanding of time as history. For many of
the ancients, particularly the Greeks, time was conceived as
the moving image of eternity (i.e., changing time is
enfolded in something unchanging that is beyond time) .
Events in time were considered meaningful to the degree that
they reflected something eternal beyond time.
Through the influence of Biblical religion, the idea of
the eternal within time took root in the West (e.g., the
Christian belief that God was incarnated in Jesus) .
Christianity was based on the eternal significance of an
historical event -- the crucifixion of Jesus. In
emphasizing the providence of God, Calvinists helped
establish the idea that all events in time were the
unfolding of God's will. As Christianity was secularized,
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the deeply held idea of the significance of historical
events turned away from providence towards progress. Time
as history for moderns means the progressive unfolding of
meaning through technique: We make our history.
Besides how we view time, another part of the animating
source for technique is how we view ourselves. Nietzsche
boldly faced the implications of the discoveries of modern
science about ourselves: We are evolutionary products of
necessity and chance. For Nietzsche, "species" or "beings"
are inaccurate descriptors of ourselves for they hint at
permanence. He preferred the metaphor "bridge" -- we are a
bridge from what we were to what we will become (Grant,
1969b, p. 27). Nietzsche called us to see the older
traditions of meaning as clever illusions unconsciously
devised to hide from ourselves the terror of the abyss --
nothing essentially "good" exists. His hope was that as we
purge ourselves of the old myths and suffer through the
agony of disillusionment, there will appear those
"superhumans" who have overcome the spirit of revenge to
love the fate in which we find ourselves. They will lead us
as deserving masters, striving to make the world, re-make
ourselves, and make meaning through the power of technique.
"We must live in the knowledge that our purposes are simply
creations of human will and not ingrained in the nature of
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things" (Grant, 1969b, p. 30) .12
As Grant pondered on the sources that animate technique
the understanding of time as history, the vision of
ourselves in the finality of becoming, .combined with the
desire to overcome chance (1971, p. 85; 1973, pp. 190-191) -
- he realized that Ellul's definition was necessary but not
sufficient. It is to Heidegger that he now turned for
illumination (Grant, 1969b, p. 18).
1974-1988: Knowing and Making: Grant's Definition of
Technology
George Grant's final concept of technology was best
defined in the essay "Thinking About Technology" (1986, pp.
11-34). It was a reworking of ideas expressed in two
earlier articles (Grant, 1975; 1976). In his definition
were resonances of his encounters with the thought of John
Oman, Jacques Ellul, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin
Heidegger.
It is obvious that I have omitted a direct review of
Nietzsche and Heidegger and an analysis of how their
thinking affected Grant's definition of technology. Why do
this with Ellul and not with them? First, Ellul's
definition is more accessible for analysis. A review of it
12 This is Grant's explication of Nietzsche. This
statement does not reflect Grant's Platonic position which
held that ul timate purpose is, however dimly perceived,
"ingrained in the nature of things." Grant is using irony
here.
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helps to provide a comparative foil to Grant's definition as
he used, critiqued and moved past it. Second, to properly
understand how technology is defined in the subtle writings
of Nietzsche and Heidegger requires the same caref~l reading
that Grant employed -- something that goes beyond the scope
of this study. The sketch of Nietzsche's thought presented
in this chapter is based on Grant's interpretation.
By 1974, Grant had changed his mind about the
appropriateness of the word technology. Technique does not
capture as well the novelty of the modern phenomenon. The
combination of the Greek words techne and logos points to a
new co-penetration of the arts and sciences that is
expressed by the neologism, technology. Techne is a Greek
word meaning art -- but art in the more inclusive sense of
making. Logos stands for discourse, word or reason. When
it is used as a suffix, such as in the word biology, it
means the "systematic study of." By toying with the .word in
this way, Grant correlated techne with making (the arts) and
logos with knowledge (the sciences) .
How does technology better capture the modern
phenomenon? Technique suggests that our making and
production have simply progressed in efficiency and
complexity from what the ancients did in their techne.
Technology better expresses that the modern phenomenon is a
new union, a co-penetration of making and knowing in which
both activities are changed. On the surface, we can see the
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interdependence of knowing and making when we consider that
new tools are designed as a result of scientific
discoveries, and, vice-versa, these new tools make possible
new discoveries. The cyclotron, the electron microscope and
the Hubble telescope are obvious examples of this. Yet it
is not clear how knowing and making are changed until we
compare them to how these activities were understood by the
ancients.
Aristotle defined art as "a rational faculty exercised
in making something" (Thompson, 1974, p. 175). It included
what we now consider as arts, crafts and manufacturing. Art
was concerned with bringing into existence something that
was not there before.
Ancient science was concerned with the study of things
as they are -- and the highest science, philosophy, was
focused on perceiving and understanding that which could not
be brought into or put out of existence: the eternal
(Thompson, 1974, p. 174). The activity of the ancient
scientist did not base itself on experimentation, but on
contemplation. The metaphysical flavour of ancient science
is repugnant to those who accept the fact/value dichotomy.
The "eternal" is something we speculate on according to our
own "value" systems. This modern stance is the end result
of a process that began in the seventeenth century when
there was a deliberate turning away from the ancient science
that was animated by the hope that the proper ends of humans
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could be discovered in the nature of things.
Once the object of science -- knowing -- shifted,
however slightly, from that which was unchanging to that
which was changeable, it was leaning into the realm of art.
This is what Grant meant by technology as "applied" science
in the literal sense -- science is folded towards art;
knowing is folded towards making. A favourite example for
Grant was the activity of nuclear physicists at Los Alamos
in the 1940s:
Physics was being "applied" not only in deciding that
American interests required the making of atomic
weapons, but also in the sense that the very
discoveries of the science were in their essence folded
towards the mastery of the energies of nature, in a way
that was absent in the pre-modern sciences. (Grant,
1986, p. 14)
Here Oman's idea of "using nature" (Grant, 1950) comes back
to haunt. The sawyer who knows the forest as a potential
for lumber has his knowledge folded towards making. Nature
-- human and non-human -- exists as potential raw material.
Heidegger (1977) defined it as "standing reserve" (pp. 17-
19). Is not this knowing-folded-towards-making what Oman
called experience being formulated out of a principle?
Changed in its essence from contemplation as it was co-
penetrated by making, the activity of knowing is
characterized by Grant as follows: "We research knowledge
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when we represent things to ourselves as objects, summonsing
[sic] them before us so that they give us their reasons"
(Grant, 1986, p. 99). This modern way of knowing that is at
the heart of technology tempts one to use the evaluative
word "interrogation," especially when humans themselves are
objectified as standing reserve. This is hinted at with the
term "human resources." Yet is not genetic engineering a
search for knowledge in which our very humanness is laid
before us to give us its reasons?
At the commonsense, even crude, level, one could say
that the arts and sciences have switched places since
ancient times. Today, the activity of the older science
would be looked at with a smile and pronounced "artsy,"
whereas the modern sciences are it: They are on the cutting
edge of making things happen.
At the deepest level, knowing has become a kind of
making in that knowledge is now understood to be constructed
-- whether we are discussing the social construction of
reality or basic paradigm shifts in science. The search for
a truth "out there" is an antiquated language concealing
from us that the abyss is primary. For Grant, at the heart
of technology there was a nihilism that we paper over with
phrases such as "the ascent of life," "human beings making
their own future," "the progress of knowledge," or "the
necessity of interfering with nature for human good" (Grant,
1986, p. 33).
I
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How has making changed as a result of this co-
penetration? Grant never directly answered that question,
but an answer will be attempted that seems consistent with
his view. Since the discoveries of modern science have
progressively laid the energies of nature at our disposal,
the arts have been enhanced in their productive power such
that the very environment we inhabit is largely of human
construction. This production has so displaced the natural
environment -- the one we depend on for sustenance -- that
we live with an ecological crisis. But describing the new
arts as simply a power enhancement of the old techne does
not show any essential change in the activity.
How has knowing penetrated making to effect such a
change? The arts have been transformed by the injection of
rationality. As Ellul pointed out, this "rationalizing" of
the arts, pushed the aesthetic element to the fringes; in
fact, the very definition of aesthetics was transformed to
mean the beauty of efficiency. The older understanding of
aesthetics has found some refuge in what we now call the
"fine arts," a nice cultural diversion to which we can be
treated if there is time left over from our obligation to
rational production, but it is no longer at the heart of
production, except as a means-to entice the consumer via
advertising.
To summarize Grant's concept of technology: On the face
of it, technology appears as the vast array of machines and
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inventions that are developed as a result of applying the
discoveries of modern science. Staying with this sense of
technology as applied science, we see it as a set of tools
that we can choose to use or lay aside according to purposes
that are outside the domain of technology.
But this hides how technology shapes us both externally
and internally. Surrounded by the artifacts of technology -
- factories, office complexes, malls, suburbs, automobiles,
computers, etc., -- our experience of the environment in
present-day North America is radically different from the
original white settlers whose experience of nature was even
more at odds with the way the aboriginal peoples experienced
it. Yet those settlers brought with them the internalized
co-penetration'of knowing and making that we share with them
at the core of ourselves.
Technology is applied science in the literal sense. It
is a new co-penetration of the arts and sciences in which
both activities are changed. The application of modern
science means that knowing is folded towards making.
In reading Grant, one may receive the impression that
technology is inherently evil. Certainly, to describe its
heart as nihilistic is, for some, a condemnation. But that
assumes that the assertion "the abyss is primary" is not
true. Certainly Grant believed it not to be true.
"Characterizing technological society as essentially
nihilistic prejudges the whole question of what it is. Such
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a dismayed reaction is as likely to close down thought about
its nature as much as does any progressivism" (Grant, 1986,
p. 29). George Grant was passionately determined to see
things as they are. He refused to closed down his thought
about the modern project or give up what he believed was
true in ancient thought. He knew there was no turning back
to some idealized vision of the past in the light of the
discoveries of modern science. He always acknowledged the
benefits of the technological society.
Grant profoundly disagreed with Heidegger on the
ultimate questions (Grant, 1991, p. 53). He followed Plato
on these matters. Heidegger followed Nietzsche. The fact
that Grant could be open to Heidegger's description of
technology, despite these differences, convinces this
writer, at least, that Grant had matured much as a thinker
since he wrote his controversial 1951 report on the state of
philosophy in Canada.
CHAPTER FOUR: KNOWING AND LOVING: GEORGE GRANT'S VISION OF
EDUCATION
George Grant was passionately concerned about the
direction of modern education. Through speeches and
articles, he revealed a love for education that included a
warning that something essential to the meaning of education
was being undermined by the development of technology.
In this chapter, two questions are posed around which
Grant's writings on education will be analyzed. First, what
was George Grant's vision of education? Second, how did he
see technology as a threat to that vision? Louis Greenspan,
a former student and colleague of Grant, reminds us that
finding clear answers to questions such as these is not
easy: "There are those who seek in Grant's philosophical
writings a systematic statement of philosophical first
principles, a summum Grantium, but this exercise is very
hazardous" (Greenspan, 1990, p. 4).
As noted in the previous chapter, Grant's polemical
writing style defies quick analysis. His critical approach
to other positions is a stance as old as Socrates who was
accused of playing the "game of questioning and refuting
someone else, instead of giving an answer himself"
(Cornford, 1974, p. 17). Even here, Grant's repudiations of
other educational theories were not thorough critiques. For
example, Grant often criticized in an unsystematic way the
ideas of progressive education, and, in particular, the
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pragmatism of John Dewey (Grant, 1945; 1952; 1953; 1954b;
1955; 1966a; 1969a; 1985b; 1993).
Whatever the validity of these criticisms, Grant never
attempted a proper critique of Dewey's ideas. He extended
this courtesy to Karl Popper (Grant, 1954a) and Bertrand
Russel (Grant,- 1952) even though he bordered on ridiculing
Popper's understanding of Plato and cast doubts on Russel's
stature as a philosopher. Since Grant viewed Dewey as a
major influence in the direction of North American
education, a comprehensive analysis of Dewey's ideas by
Grant would have contributed to a debate on Dewey's impact,
particularly since some critical theorists conclude that
Dewey's proposals for school reform went nowhere (Bowles &
Gintis, 1976).
To add to the difficulty of analysis, Grant's ideas
changed through the course of his writings. Someone who
attempts to sketch a "summum Grantium" on education must
keep in mind how the later Grant viewed the earlier Grant.
For instance, in a preface to an article which he had first
published six years earlier on the place of religion in
public schools, Grant called his piece folly because "it did
not grasp what the technological society really is" (Grant,
1969a, p. 43). Why, then, would he allow it to be
republished? His cryptic answer: "There would be little
point in republishing this essay simply as an illustration
of my own changes in thought or my particular vices, but
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something like this happens in all open thinking" (Grant,
1969a, p. 44). The process that he called "open thinking"
was a constant in his life and is a keyword in understanding
Grant's vision of education.
A more dramatic example: Grant published a 1988
addendum to an article first written in 1953 in which he
identified the chief mistake he made in the earlier piece.
He had used the language of modern existentialism in
explaining certain Biblical ideas (Grant, 1990, p. 16). A
few months before he died, Grant viewed his own education as
a lifelong, continuing struggle to free himself from the
language of modernity (Grant, 1990, p. 17). Words such as
"ideals" and "values" which he had liberally used in his
pre-1960 writings were eschewed later on. This striving to
transcend in thought the assumptions of his age was a
conscious rejection of historicism and an expression of
faith, based on ancient Greek and Christian traditions, that
there is truth out there and that it can be known.
To return to the problem of analysis: Being aware of
how Grant's ideas and use of words changed, one must
carefully sift through his writings, pullout the salient
ideas on education and then allow those ideas to be
qualified by Grant's later work. The distillation which
follows spares the reader some of the details of this
sifting and qualifying in the interest of clarity.
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Grant's Vision of Education
Grant's ideas on education may be grouped around three
themes: first, his polemics on progressive education,
second, his acceptance of Plato, and third, his admiration
for Simone Weil.
The case against progressive education. Early on in
his career, George Grant championed the cause of the
"traditional" educator. In 1945, Jean Morrison, the editor
of Food for Thought, the journal of the Canadian Association
for Adult Education, claimed that this older method of
instruction taught that ideas were aloof from action.
Students grounded in the classics could appreciate the good,
the beautiful and the true but were never directed "towards
trying to achieve the good in their own community"
(Morrison, 1945, p. 2). In the next issue, Grant retorted:
The claims of classical education were not that they
cut people off from life but rather that by their
techniques they taught people to see life clearly.
Classics, history, philosophy, were not taught in an
effort to detach ideas from reality; they were taught
so that people would have a strong, tough instrument
with which to analyze reality. (Grant, 1945)
In a 1948 review of R.S.K. Seeley's book, The Function
of the University, Grant expressed disappointment in the
fact that Seeley failed to mention how universities are
governed by businessmen. This political reality had
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consequences for the future growth of the science
departments and the teaching of classics: Is there any doubt
how the financial resources would be allocated?
Nevertheless, Grant praised the book as Ita clear and well
intentioned statement of an ideal which reconciles the best
in all possible worlds satisfactorily for all concerned"
(Grant, 1948, p. 44).
Seeley's short book is not very provocative but it is
worth noting his ideas of higher education which seemed so
praiseworthy to Grant. Seeley's definition of education is
the old liberal arts view: It was a seeking after truth to
gain knowledge and wisdom so as to know how to live. He
cited John Milton: ItI call therefore a complete and generous
education that which fits a man [sic] to perform justly,
skilfully and magnanimously all the offices both private and
public of peace and war" (Seeley, 1948, p. 21).
The specialist, to be effective in his or her field,
needed this general, liberal arts education. It was not
simply to be a series of survey courses that acted as an
annoying prelude for the student whose goal was engineering
or medicine. It was hard work:
At some point the student must be made aware of the
discipline involved in an enquiry of truth. He [sic]
must be shaken from the assurance that the answers lie
in the textbook. He [sic] must be discouraged from
being content with these prescribed horizons and must
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sense in the whole atmosphere of lecture room and
library and common room a spirit of enquiry, a
cultivation of mind, of which his prescribed courses
are but the setting and the background, and which
demand of him a self-imposed discipline of research and
study. (Seeley, 1948, pp. 14-15)
However, what Grant overlooked in Seeley was a phrase
for which he would later mercilessly criticize pragmatists.
Seeley defined a university as "a community of people
pursuing knowledge and truth for the sake of more perfectly
adjusting themselves to society" (Seeley, 1948, p. 16).
Grant would later view this education for social adjustment
as a "lowering of the sights" because, in the classical
view, excellence in education was defined as a journey of
the mind that transcended social parameters.
In a series of articles and talks given in the fifties,
George Grant attacked the philosophical basis of progressive
education -- the pragmatism of William James and John
Deweyl (Grant 1953; 1954b; 1955; 1966a, pp. 82-97). Grant
contrasted the traditional theory of education over against
this progressivism. Although he did not explicitly phrase
1 This was an about-face for Grant. A decade earlier he
had considered himself a North American pragmatist, named
James and Dewey his favourite philosophers, and considered
Dewey's pedagogic creed a "complete justification" of his
father's life as a school teacher (Christian, 1993, p. 84).
His biographer did not record clear reasons for Grant I s
radical rej ection of pragmatism except to suggest that it
stemmed from his wartime conversion experience (Christian,
1993, p. 104).
I
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them, Grant saw two major questions at issue between these
theories: One, is there a God or the Good, and does the
existence of such ultimate Reality really matter in a theory
of education? Two, what is the role of reason in education?
Is reason something that defines that which is essentially
human? Is reason peripheral to our core humanity? Is
reason essentially an instrument used by the "id" to
manipulate nature according to subjective purposes that
themselves have no rational basis? For Grant, questions
such as these were foundational in any theory of education.
The answers would determine the curricula for children and
adults.
In the classical tradition of education, the existence
of ultimate Reality or Truth or God, although not proven at
the outset, was assumed. The purpose of education was to
train the mind to seek after this reality and, from the
discoveries made, the student would order his or her life in
harmony with the "truths" so discovered. The educated
person trained in contemplation would increasingly perceive
the truth and increasingly know it -- outside of any
consideration for the modern idea of empirical proof. The
life lived in harmony with these ideas apprehended in
contemplation would display the truth in action through
virtuous living and so "prove" them.
In Grant's view of the pragmatist approach to
education, a different decision is made at the outset.
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Unlike the classicist, the pragmatist takes the problem of
proving the existence of "truth" as a reason to not assume
its existence. Since it cannot be rationally appropriated
at the beginning of the educational journey, the question of
the existence of this "ultimate reality" is set aside.
Different people have different answers to this question and
since rational discourse has not been able to settle these
metaphysical differences, reason is not seen as capable of
grasping these so-called truths. It is a question of
individual preferences or "faith." Any public educational
institution must not only respect these differences in a
pluralistic society but any discussion of these separate
positions concerning ultimate truth must stay at the level
of "information about" rather than "debate between."
Since these ultimate questions cannot be rationally
resolved, pragmatism restricts the role of reason -- it can
only be used to deal with solvable problems in the practical
realm. In pragmatism, "Reason operates for dealing with the
world but not for giving one truth for how one should act or
what one should worship" (Grant, 1955, p. 279). Grant
viewed John Dewey's basic proposition as being that:
Reason is only an instrument for manipulating the
world. The religious, ethical and metaphysical
quest~ons ... are a realm where reason cannot operate
.... But this proposition cannot be justified in
thought. You cannot by reason show that reason has no
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power. (Grant, 1955, p. 279)
According to Grant, this contradiction in pure
pragmatism is what showed it to be a false philosophy:
That pragmatism is not a philosophy at all but the
denial of philosophy can, of course, be seen in its
central contradiction, namely its making of theory
subordinate to practice. For a theory which asserts
the subordination of all theory to social usefulness
has no way of knowing whether its own theory is true.
(Grant, 1953, p. 4)
Grant concluded that a pragmatic theory of education was
founded on a profound irrationalism, whereas in the
classical view, the place of reason was supreme in that it
was believed that ethical and moral questions could be
discussed based on a hope that the infinite universe had a
rational basis that could be known.
An impatient, radical pragmatist might retort as
follows: "Let's stop this ivory tower speculation! You
philosophers have had 2,500 years since Plato to come up
with the answers. Let's face it -- there are no answers out
there. Let's quit wasting our time spinning our intellectual
wheels with questions that cannot be rationally resolved.
If you need the comfort of religion or myth to settle your
emotions so that you can function in society, well and good;
otherwise see a therapist to help you with your ontological
insecurity. Let's get on with the job of creating a better
'!
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society and dealing with problems that we have the power to
do something about, such as poverty, crime, war and disease.
We, and our children, need to be educated in such a way that
we are equipped with the technical skills and right
attitudes to tackle these pressing problems."
Grant agreed with the necessity of confronting these
practical issues. However, he felt that since pragmatism
was so theoretically weak and had lower expectations for the
role of reason, it would fail on a practical level in the
long run. Classical education, as he noted above, did not
aim at cutting promising thinkers off from life to speculate
idly while the world seethed in agony. Rather, it aimed to
develop keen minds to take the longer view so that practical
problems such as crime and poverty could be correctly
understood in order to "solve" them in a lasting way.
Classical education, though it seemed impractical at the
outset -- (Why study the War of 1812? How will it help me
get a better paying job when I grow up?) -- was more
practical in the long run. Pragmatism might be successful
in the short run as long as its practitioners were guided by
certain moral ideas that they had inherited from the ancient
tradition. (Is not a genuine concern for alleviating
suffering partially rooted -- in the West at least -- in the
Christian tradition of charity?) Yet once circumstances
were to change, and the irrational basis for these moral
ideas exposed, why would concern for one's neighbours be
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considered good? For example, the belief in the equality of
human beings might be explained as a preference of a certain
class, a necessary moment in the evolution of the race, or a
nice emotion that no longer is practical.
For Grant, the fact that the 2,SOO-year-old debate
about foundational questions had not been resolved did not
necessarily mean that these questions should be banished
from the court of reason. On the contrary, it was Grant's
belief that this intellectual striving with these questions
was what brought out the best in humans. An educational
system that ignored these questions or relegated them to
secondary status was reducing the possibility of excellence
in its students. A university that allowed its students to
view this type of discourse as just so much philosophical
semantics was encouraging a trivializing of the purpose of
the institution.
One of Dewey's claims was that he was attempting a
democratic model of eduction which could strengthen the
democratic way of life. Grant argued that pragmatism would
ultimately fail in doing this. George Grant was a staunch
supporter of democracy and firmly believed in the moral and
political equality of all humans. Yet he could see no other
sustaining basis for this equality than a religious one.
Grant argued that there was no earthly reason to treat
people of unequal abilities equally (Grant, 1961, pp. 21-
22). Nietzsche and Grant both perceived the implications of
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the public abrogation of the religious basis of equality
more clearly than pragmatists who assumed such equality to
be self-evident and did not recognize their emotional
commitment to this principle as an echo of a dying
secularized Christianity. This is how Grant would answer
the question: Does the existence of ultimate reality really
matter in a theory of education?
The acceptance of Plato. How then did Grant define
education and knowledge? He broadly defined education as
"all the activities of the human mind of which philosophy is
the crown" (Grant, 1953, p. 4). More specifically, it
reminded him of Plato's allegory of the cave "wherein human
existence is described as the movement out of the shadows
and imaginings of ignorance into the sunlight of knowledge"
(Grant, 1953, p. 4). By knowledge Grant meant. "any means
that brings the human spirit to self -consciousness ,,2
(Grant, 1953, p. 4).
The purpose of education was to make people free.
"This freeing of the finite mind from the chains of illusion
was the purpose of life and by definition its goal was
infinite" (Grant, 1954, p. 6). Freedom was not a stance
humans had before this process of education began in their
lives -- Grant rejected the existentialist notion of
"authentic" freedom. Freedom was the acceptance of truth
2 By "self-consciousness", Grant is using a modern term
to describe the ancient ~ictum: Know thyself. This is an
example of the early Grant using "existential" language.
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received once this truth had been apprehended through
education. "Whatever differences there may be between
Platonism and Christianity as to how and when truth is given
us, it is clear that in both freedom is given us through
truth. 'The truth shall make you free'"3 (Grant, 1990, p.
16) .
The allegory of the cave in Plato's Republic had a
tremendous impact on Grant's view of knowledge and
education. Plato's epistemology and theory of education
form a unified account together with an ontology that seems
to be quite the opposite to what it claims to be from a
modern perspective. What Plato would call "real," we would
call "ideal." What we would call "real" he would call
"illusion."
It is not clear how much of Plato's ontology,
epistemology and theory of education Grant accepted. He
often compared the death of Socrates with the death of
Christ. George Grant was certainly the living embodiment of
the tension between Athens and Jerusalem -- the same poles
of reason and revelation that he identified as being the two
primals of Western civilization. Certainly, in the latter
half of his academic career, he used the Platonic term, the
3 These are the words of Jesus according to the gospel
writer: "If you hold to my teaching, you are really my
disciples. Then you will know the truth and the truth will
set you free" (John 8:32). "What is truth?" Pilate asked
Jesus at his trial. No answer is recorded for us (John
18:38).
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Good, in the place of God. Yet, for Grant, when it came to
considering what activity was the height for humans, love as
defined in the Gospels was higher than contemplation in
Plato's Republic.
Plato was a realist in the traditional philosophical
meaning of that term. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary (1967) defines realism as the "doctrine that
universals exist outside the mind." Education in Plato's
world was a journey upward from the world of appearances
(the visible world, immediate to the senses and always in a
constant flux or change) through to the intelligible world
(the invisible world to the senses and only apprehended by
the mind). Piaget's cognitive theory follows a similar
pattern from concrete operational (dealing with visible
objects) to formal operational (dealing with abstract
concepts). Whereas Piaget's paradigm for his cognitive
theories was conceptualist (i.e., the universals existed in
the mind only), Plato believed that the objects of the
intelligible word, the forms, existed as much outside of the
mind as did visible, concrete objects. In fact, he would
argue that the invisible forms such as beauty or truth were
more real than the concrete, visible objects. His argument
for their reality was based on permanence. In the
intelligible world the sum, two plus two, always equals
four. In the visible world things are always changing their
form, -- decaying, eroding, rusting -- and are always
85
passing into and out of existence.
What feature of Plato's theory of education would
George Grant most likely affirm? The aim of education in
Plato's imaginary city-state was to develop four main
virtues in the students: temperance, courage, wisdom and
justice. In primary education, the curricula would be
closely monitored so that no stories or music would be
taught that might discourage the development of those
virtues.
The curricula would be divided into two main branches -
- the training of the body and the training of the mind or
soul. Both these branches would have the common aim of
educating the soul to develop the four virtues.
Higher education would consist of two stages.
Mathematics would be taught to cultivate in the mind the
ability to perceive the abstract forms. Those who mastered
this stage could proceed -- usually not until the age of
thirty -- to engage in "dialectics," which consisted of the
two activities of contemplation and dialogue in order that
the student's mind could eventually perceive the eternal
forms -- beauty, truth, justice. Plato believed that one
form was supreme on which all else was dependent the Good
which was beyond being (Cornford, 1974, p. 220).
There are certain features of Plato's educational
system which seem to the modern eye to be non-traditional or
even "progressive":
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1. Women were included in the total educational
system and in every area of society right up to
the ruling Guardian class (Cornford, 1974, p.
262) .
2. Instruction in the primary grades avoided
compulsion. "Enforced exercise does no harm to the
body, but enforced learning will not stay in the
mind. So avoid compulsion and let your children's
lessons take the form of play" (Cornford, 1974, p.
258) .
3. Knowledge was not something an educator could pour
into someone's head. Each student possessed the
power to learn. The instructor's job was to turn
their minds in the right direction. (Cornford,
1974, p. 232).
George Grant's passion to see things "as they are" is
based on his acceptance of Plato's ontology and
epistemology. Socrates was very hesitant about describing
truth itself and he would only use an allegory to illustrate
the Good:
I cannot be sure whether or not I see it as it really
is; but we can be sure that there is some such reality
which it concerns us to see ... no one will maintain
against us that there is any other method of inquiry
which systematically attempts in every case to grasp
the nature of each thing as it is in itself.
(Cornford, 1974, p. 253).
The admiration of Simone Weil. George Grant greatly
admired Simone Weil because, to him, she was not only a
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great thinker but she had lived out her life in such a way
that he called her a "saint" by which he meant someone
who gave herself away. Like Grant, Weil intellectually
combined Christiani-ty and Platonism. Weil taught Grant I
even more than Strauss, how to read Plato.
It was Weil's definition of faith that helped Grant
make clear his vision of education as the interdependence of
knowing and loving (Grant, 1982; Grant, 1986a, pp. 35-37).
She defined faith as the experience that the intelligence is
illuminated by love. Grant spent much time trying to
understand that definition. One way he did that was by
analyzing the key concepts - love, intelligence,
illumination and experience.
"Love is consent to the fact that there is authentic
otherness" (Grant, 1986a, p. 38). Grant did not accept the
distinction many Westerners (especially Christians) have
made between agape (giving love) and eros (need love). Love
was a continuum of desire -- expressing a genuine need
from a foot fetishist to St. Francis' love for the lepers.
Love is an expression of desire or need for that which is
other to us. Sexual love is a clear and powerful
illustration of this -- but when sexuality is cut off from
love, it becomes a using of the other person for self-
gratification without regard for the other. The other
becomes a sex object for us and when that happens the
experience of the reality of the other person is diminished.
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Since we instinctively know that this objectification of
another human is not good, it is a way for us to begin to
understand that "objective knowledge" may be a contradiction
in terms.
Objective knowledge is the goal of modern science.
Grant had a problem with that idea because to know something
as an object -- literally "thrown against" was to destroy
the possibility of knowing something on its own terms (as it
is in itself). For Grant, objective knowledge was not
knowledge at all for the process of turning anything into an
object for research denatured the very thing that one was
seeking to know.
Can we truly know another person when we do not love
him or her? In the older English of the King James Version
of the Bible, the statement that Adam knew his wife Eve was
a description of the act of sexual love. That statement
also echqed the pre-modern notion that loving and knowing
were interdependent.
To have regard for the other is a waiting on the other,
a giving of attention so that one is receptive to what the
other will present to us. We realize this in our social
discourse when we force ourselves to truly listen to another
person. We must discipline ourselves to stop our own train
of thought, a tendency to daydream or think about something
else that interferes with our reception to the communication
given by the other. In return, when the person who is
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conversing with us is aware of our attention, he or she
feels in some measure loved. The fact that Grant saw
"authentic otherness" as the core of loving shows how far he
had moved from the ideas and language of existentialism. In
this account, hell is defined as being one's own, as
belonging to oneself,4 -- the state of the tyrant's soul
painted in the Republic. Sartre wrote that hell is other
people.
The definition of intelligence is more problematic. Is
there a certain standard of measurable intellectual ability
that one must possess before that intelligence can be
illuminated by love? Again, Grant never directly answered
that question. Sometimes one gets the impression that Grant
preferred an aristocratic model of education and government
where the best and the brightest were encouraged to join
that extremely small group of contemplative philosophers at
the apex of Plato's Republic. Other times in class he would
throw out an aphorism such as, "The village simpleton who
truly loves his neighbour is wiser than Aristotle." He
always believed that love was higher than contemplation. I
think it is safe to conclude that Grant and Weil both held
that it was not the power of the intellect that was the
determining factor in possessing knowledge but the degree to
which the intelligence had been illumined by love.
4 The greatest comfort for a Christian is the realization
that one does not belong to oneself.
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The above conclusion is supported by Simone Weil's
essay on education, "Reflection on the Right Use of School
Studies with a View to the Love of God" (Weil, 1974, pp. 66-
76). The purpose of school studies, she thought, was not
ultimately to pass examinations or become proficient in a
certain area of knowledge. It was to cultivate that faculty
of attention that was the substance of prayer and of loving
one's neighbour:
A Latin prose or a geometry problem, even though they
are done wrong, may be of great service one day,
provided we devote the right kind of effort to them.
Should the occasion arise, they can one day make us
better able to give someone in affliction exactly the
help required to save him [sic] / at the supreme moment
of his [sic] need. (Weil, 1974, p. 76)
Not only is lack of ability in a certain subject area
not considered a liability in Weil's view of education,
rather, it is considered an advantage in developing a
person's capacity for attention over against someone for
whom learning comes easily.
Weil's definition of attention uncovers further the
Platonic epistemology and ontology that undergirds Grant's
thought - seeing something as it is in itself, being
receptive to otherness:
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving
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it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by the
object .... Our thought should be empty, waiting, not
seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked
truth the object which is to penetrate it. (Weil, 1974,
p. 72)
The word illumination evokes the metaphor of the sun
used by Plato to describe the attainment of knowledge. The
sun in Plato's cave allegory stood for the supreme form -
the Good. The sun was the source of light that made it
possible for the prisoners emerging from the darkness of the
cave to see actual objects as opposed to the shadows
flickering on the cave wall that they had previously
believed were real. Yet, the sun was not only a light
source making vision possible it was also the energy source
for all life on earth. In the same way, the Good was not
only the source of illumination for the mind, it was also
that which sustained the existence of the mind.
Finally, faith is an experience which Grant defined as
"something given to us" (Grant, 1982, p. 109). This meant
that faith was "not a matter of will, or of choice or of
merit" (Grant, 1982, p. 109). Faith defined as an
experience of illumination is clearly not a blind leap in
the dark.
Conclusion. George Grant's vision of education was
based on a Platonic ontology and epistemology. It asserted
the existence of universals outside of the mind that could
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be known -- albeit not easily -- through an educative
process that maintained the interdependence of knowing and
loving. One can only know that which one loves and vice
versa. To be able "to see things as they are" was the goal
for this eduction. The fact that few people, if any,
reached this goal was not a good reason to abandon it. It
was the striving after this goal that produced excellence in
the soul or the mind even though one's vision may never be
totally cleared of all personal and social biases,
prejudices and illusions. "Now we see but a poor reflection
as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face" (I
Corinthians 13:12 NIV).
Technology as a Threat to Grant's Vision of Education
As is now obvious, technology conceived as a co-
penetration of knowing and making leaves love outside of its
core. The assertion that was made at the beginning of the
development of modern technological science was that
ultimate goodness -- belief in which made something lovable
-- could not be known through a systematic study of the
visible world. At first this was simply a setting of proper
boundaries. The new natural sciences were not concerned
with the question of ultimate purpose -- this was considered
the domain of theology. Yet as the sciences progressed in
the years that followed, the power of ,their discoveries
based on the laws of necessity and chance destroyed much
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confidence that what one ought to do could be known from
what is. This led to the famous fact/value split as
unquestioned dogma.
This did not mean that love is absent in the activity
of scientists. Certainly scientists love what they are
doing and are led by a desire to know. But at the core of
technological science is a striving to know objectively. As
noted in the example concerning sexual love, how can you
love something when you know it as object? Grant defined
scientific research as' "the summonsing [sic] of something
before us and the putting of questions to it, so that it is
forced to give its reasons for being the way it is as an
object" (Grant, 1986, p. 86). Can you really know something
when you approach it as object? Can you love something -
consent to it as other -- when you approach it as a
potential resource -- something at your disposal? The
answer to that question is clearer when that something is a
human being.
When environmentalists are warning us that thousands of
species of life are being destroyed in the rainforest and
when volunteer gardeners in Canada are helping the
Department of Agriculture grow various grains that are no
longer in commercial production, what type of reasoning is
used to justify saving these threatened species? Is it not
that we may need these resources in the future to combat
some yet unknown disease or supplement a poor diet? Is
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there a reason why something should exist for us outside of
this paradigm of utility?
As for education, it is not the machines and convenient
inventions that threaten the growth of knowledge and
understanding, it is that co-penetration of knowing and
making that is darkening our minds as we refuse to allow
love to illumine our thinking at the core of technology.
This is how Grant perceived the threat. But if one
understands his Platonic position correctly it does not
threaten the existence of those forms which he believed were
ultimately real, nor did it threaten the education of those
who affirmed the interdependence of knowing and loving. No,
it threatened the education of those who maintained that the
co-penetration of knowing and making was the unfolding of
truth and what has love got to do with it?
,CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITIQUE OF GEORGE GRANT IN THE LIGHT OF
JOHN DEWEY
How can one properly evaluate George Grant's thinking
on technology and education? A thorough, scholarly critique
of Grant's concept of technology and his vision of education
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Even narrowing the
focus to his definition of technology would involve more
than a cursory reading of the current state of the
philosophy of technology. The "classic" anthology in this
field, Mitcham and Mackey's Philosophy and Technology
(1983), introduces twenty-four contributions, including one
by George Grant. Appended to the paperback edition of this
book is a select bibliography that lists over 350 books and
articles devoted to exploring the meaning of technology from
a philosophical perspective.
Instead of attempting such a prodigious task and risk
losing the focus of this thesis -- the relationship of
technology and education I limit my analysis of Grant's
position by comparing it to the one established by one of
North America's leading philosophers, John Dewey. Dewey
wrote extensively on education but he has only recently been
regarded as a philosopher of technology (Hickman, 1994).
Dewey's concept of technology is summarized and compared to
Grant's definition. The main source is Larry Hickman's
(1990) scholarship on Dewey's understanding of technology.
Finally, I use what is considered Dewey's most concise
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statement on education, Experience and Education (1938), as
a way of evaluating Grant's educational vision and the
interaction between technology and education.
John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology by Larry Hickman
(1990) is a well-documented book of approximately 200 pages
that set out to justify the claim that Dewey was thinking
about technology well before other celebrated philosophers
of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger. I found
this claim rather amusing even before I started reading the
book. The reason for my scepticism was that I accepted
George Grant's put-down of North American philosophy. Grant
firmly believed that the English-speaking tradition of
philosophy was much weaker than the continental European
strain -- particularly the German variety. Because the
English-speakers had successfully steered the technological
dynamo and used it to maintain international political
dominance, first in Britain and later in the U.S., there was
no need for sustained, philosophical reflection. North
American pragmatic philosophy, in Grant's view, was not
really philosophy, but a flattering rationalization of
technology as progress. Convinced of the success of their
liberal political traditions and scientific accomplishments,
North Americans were not impelled to seriously reflect on
the dynamo within which they moved and enjoyed life. (Dewey
also saw reflective thinking arising in response to an
experience of disruption.) So, Grant judged the tradition
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of philosophy in the English-speaking world in general and
the North American pragmatic branch in particular as weak.
He had read no one in that tradition who could match
Heidegger's brilliance in thinking about technology.
Perhaps the main reason Dewey is not widely recognized
as a philosopher of technology is that he did not devote one
book or article to the subject. Is Hickman's book a clever
re-construction of John Dewey's thought to make him appear
to be a "heavyweight contender" in the current debate on the
meaning of technology?
Hickman may be right about Dewey for two reasons: One,
Dewey himself wondered late in his life whether he should
have systematically used the term "technology" instead of
"instrumentalism" to denote his theory of inquiry (Hickman,
1990, p. 58). Second, Dewey's concept of technology was
very similar to the one that Grant eventually formulated in
the 1970s.
John Dewey's Concept of Technology
Unlike Grant, John Dewey did not develop one single
definition Of technology (Hickman, 1990, p. 44).
Nevertheless, Hickman managed to piece together a Deweyan
conception which is strikingly similar to Grant's idea that
technology is a co-penetration of knowing (science) and
making (art). Dewey "sought to demonstrate that the methods
and means by which technological inquiry takes place are the
98
methods and means by which all knowing, in its 'honorific'
sense, is generated" (Hickman, 1990, p. 4).
Dewey's conception of technology ("instrumentalism")
was founded, like his ideas in education, on his theory of
experience. For Dewey, all experience could be roughly
divided into two phases the "stable" and the "motile."
In the stable phase "union with an environing situation is
enjoyed" (Hickman, 1990, p. 60). Whether one is enjoying
the warm company of friends, the cool freshness of a spring
morning, or the brilliant colours of a Van Gogh landscape,
the experience is direct and one in which reflective
thinking in the Deweyan sense is not required or even
desired.
This stable phase of experience can be further sub-
divided into two types, yet, this subdivision begins to
reveal the need for technological inquiry between them. The
first type of stable experience is that of "the old
repetition of ceremony, tradition, institution, and the
habitual" (Hickman, 1990, p. 60). This is the enjoyment of
the comfortable routines that give a regulating structure to
our daily lives. In the Deweyan analysis, there is nothing
wrong with this except that it can lead to a dull monotony
where what is formerly enjoyed becomes boring. The second
type of stable experience is that of the "novelty of freshly
solved problems, newly pregnant situations and enjoyed
recent successes" (Hickman, 1990, p. 60).
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In between these two types of stable experiences is the
motile phase "in which loss of integration importunes and
recovery of harmony and balance is actively sought"
(Hickman, 1990, p. 60). In this phase, thinking or
intelligence is employed to find a way to recover harmony
with the environment. The occasion of disharmony or
"cognitive dissonance" can be caused by some external or
internal disruption of habitual activity or an experienced
tedium of these same habits -- being in a "rut" -- that can
act as a stimulus for entering the motile phase.
Deweyan inquiry is a process by which an individual or
a group uses intelligent activity to alter elements in the
environing situation according to "ends-in-view" that are
related to recovering a stable phase of experience. Dewey's
theory of experience was founded on Darwinian evolutionary
biology (i.e., humans are organisms that-seek to survive and
grow by adapting themselves to their environments) .
Further, humans have gained their place at the apex of
evolution because they have been able to use inquiry to go
beyond adaptation of themselves to modification of their
environments to suit their needs. We are "bridges," as
Nietzsche wrote, from what we were to what we will become. 1
Inquiry, then, is the means of effective control of an
environment that is not what we wish it to be. This,
according to Dewey, is technology: It is an active
1 See discussion of Time as History in chapter three.
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productive inquiry that is relative to an individual in a
concrete situation (Hickman, 1990, p. 23).
I will elaborate on a scenario sketched by Hickman
(1990, pp. 21-24) that illustrated how inquiry is related to
the way a situation is experienced: the repair of a light
switch. This domestic fix-it is active productive inquiry
if it is successfully accomplished by a homeowner with
relatively little prior knowledge of electrical circuits.
This novice electrician is in the motile phase of
experience, trying out different tools and approaches to the
problem until it is resolved. Unless he or she happens by
chance to come upon the solution immediately, the novice may
experience tension, anxiety and frustration as different
attempts to repair the switch or discover the source of the
problem fail. Unless the individual employs intelligence
patiently to systematically tryout different avenues for
repair, such as consulting a popular manual of home
maintenance, active productive inquiry is not taking place.
The defining characteristic of Deweyan inquiry is
intelligent control exercised by the individual, over a
broad range of activities directed at the problem. For
instance, the individual: a) remembers or records different
attempts at solving the problem (control of past actions);
b) manipulates different elements of the environment to test
out different ideas (experimentation); c) reflects on the
situation to produce and construct different ideas and
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hypotheses; d) exhibits self-control (does not give in to
the temptation to quit) and manages feelings of frustration
that may hinder the process of inquiry.
For an experienced electrician, on the other hand, the
repair of a light switch is not part of the motile phase: It
is not active productive inquiry. For this tradesperson it
is a routine operation, part of the habits acquired and at
rest in the stable phase of experience. So, what for one
person is a problem that requires the investment of energy
directed towards productive inquiry, is for another simply a
routine matter. This is how inquiry is relative to an
individual in a concrete situation, how it is related to the
way a situation is experienced.
Why did Dewey, according to Hickman, equate active
productive inquiry with technology? For Dewey, technology
was part of a continuum going all the way back to the Greek
idea of techne -- the productive arts. What the ancient
Greek artisan was doing in his trade was essentially no
different from what a modern experimental scientist or a
successful modern artist is doing today. They were or are
all involved in productive inquiry. In Hickman's analysis,
productive inquiry in Dewey's thought could legitimately be
called technology because all the elements in the
experienced situation - both tangible, external ones and
internal, "mental" thoughts - can function as tools for the
individual in solving a problem. Anything available can be
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fashioned by the individual into a tool - wood and metal for
a hammer, colours in a painting, procedures for a research
method, or ideas for a theoretical construct.
A tool for Dewey was always defined according to its
function - what it did in inquiry - not according to its
structure, what it is. An object was never a tool in and of
itself until it was constructed and used in a particular \
situation for a particular "end-in-view."
Because of Dewey's all-inclusive definition of tools,
knowing itself was understood as a "technological artifact"
(Hickman, 1990, pp. 17-59).
Meanings are for Dewey the artifacts of inquiry at one
or more of its levels of complexity and precision, and
whether they are at rest in experience that is
aesthetic or whether they are undergoing active
generative transformation in productive inquiry,
meanings constitute what is important in human
experience. (Hickman, 1990, p. 30)
Theories, ideas and hypotheses are tools produced and
constructed by humans to gain leverage or control over a
perceived problematic situation. Knowledge is not
discovered; it is made.
Logical entities are tools that arise out of the
techniques of control. The inquiry that scientists and
logicians undertake is a tool-using activity and,
therefore, even in its most abstract phases, a form of
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practical productive skill (Hickman, 1990, p. 47).
For Dewey, the termination of the process of inquiry,
its coming to rest as knowledge, is the securing of
control. It is for this reason that we may term
knowing a technological triumph. (Hickman, 1990, p. 51)
Technology: Comparing Dewey's and Grant's Concepts.
It seems clear that Dewey's active productive inquiry
can almost be equated with Grant's co-penetration of knowing
and making. Agreement on the broad contours of the
definition of modern technology is substantial. First, we
will examine the major areas of agreement. Then we will
evaluate their differences which seem minor, but only on the
surface.
Similarities. Dewey agrees with Grant in some
important issues in understanding technology. First of all,
technology embraces both the sciences and the arts.
Technology is not applied science in its usual sense: Modern
science is a branch of technology rather than vice-versa
(Hickman, 1990, p. 46).
Secondly, science owes more to art than art does to
science (Hickman, 1990, p. 75). Grant expressed it as
knowing is "folded towards" making.
Third, both Grant and Dewey agree that ancient Greek
science was not technological. For the ancients,
contemplation was the activity that yielded knowledge. For
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the moderns, experimentation produces knowledge.
Fourth, I do not think Grant would have much difficulty
accepting Dewey's explication of technology as active
productive inquiry. I think he would see the Deweyan
language as another way of saying that knowing is a type of
making and that for us moderns we can only know something
through the activity of production. But then the debate on
some "minor" issues would begin.
Nevertheless, Grant's definition of technology stands
up very well when compared with Dewey's conception. In
fact, Grant and Dewey have arrived at this relatively
similar understanding from very different theoretical
perspectives which, I believe, strengthens and confirms each
of their analyses of the meaning of technology. For me, the
Grantian formulation is more concise and elegant: Technology
is the co-penetration of knowing and making.
Differences. I purposely left out the subordinate
clause in Grant's definition -- "in which both activities
are changed by their co-penetration" (1986a, p. 13) --
because it is one of the details over which Grant and Dewey
would disagree. To state that the activities of knowing and
making have changed since ancient times is to imply two
notions that Dewey did not accept: one, that modern
production is essentially a different activity from ancient
craft; and two, that ancient science can be accorded any
status as knowledge.
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Dewey would argue that modern technology had evolved
into a sophisticated version of its ancient predecessor,
techne. Hickman recognized that Dewey disagreed with
Heidegger who - and Grant accepted this - maintained that
modern technology was something new (Heidegger, 1977, p. 14;
Grant, 1986a, pp. 12-13):
For Dewey, however, in contradistinction t~ Heidegger,
there is no radical break between the productive skills
that predated the rise of modern science and those that
precipitated and attended it .... For Dewey, productive
skills that are prescientific and those that are
scientific exist along a continuum of ever more complex
and fruitful articulation of instrumentation in the
broad sense of that term. (Hickman, 1990, p. 61)
Grant would call Dewey's historical understanding of
the development of technology
obscuring because it hides the fact that something new
has arisen not from a scientific study of the arts
which leaves them systematized but essentially
unchanged, but rather by the penetration of the arts by
discoveries of science which changes those arts in
their very essence. (Grant, 1975, p. 63)
How did Grant understand the activity of techne that
the ancient Greek artisans practised? How did he conceive
of art that had not been penetrated by science? Again, in
my reading of Grant, I find no clear answers to these
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questions. It seems that the ancient artist and craftsman
was guided by a telos, an end that was much more final than
Dewey's provisional "end-in view." For instance, a
carpenter works from a set design (analogous to a telos) and
he/she sets about 'bringing forth (pro-ducing) and gathering
together (con-structing) so that what comes into existence
is in accordance with the original design. Once it meets
these specifications, it is complete. In the same way,
learning a trade or craft was a matter of imitation. The
"development" of an art beyond this imitation of the master
of a craft was a foreign idea in a pre-modern culture where
the introduction of an innovation was a comparatively rare
occurrence.
What Dewey seemed to skip over here is that both Greek
artisans and scientists inhabited a society where telos2
was the guiding principle for action. Telos meant purpose
or end and it provided a limit to what could (or should) be
produced. Modern technology or Deweyan productive inquiry
does not contain this idea of limit that we sometimes forget
was so powerfully present in the everyday life of pre-modern
societies. To say that the ancient craftsperson engaged in
active productive inquiry with all its resonances of
experimentation is to be insensitive to the world-and-life
view of the ancients, - part of that traditional
2 There were significant minorities,
Epicureans, who did not accept telos.
such as the
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"superstitious" past that Dewey consistently attacked - and
to ignore the power that this world view had on the thinking
and activity of ancient production.
Both Dewey and Grant would maintain that ancient
science and art were understood by those who practised them
as separate activities. However, Dewey was not willing to
concede that the highest ancient scientific activity --
contemplation - was a genuine type of knowing. Active
productive inquiry was being practised by the artisans only.
Further, the so-called "scientists," Plato and Aristotle,
had "plundered" the activity of the craftsperson "for models
from which to build intellectualist cosmologies and social
theories" (Hickman, 1990, p. 95). For Dewey, contemplation
of the eternal Forms was a stalling of inquiry. Ancient
science was not real science because it was focused on what
is and never changes. For Dewey and most moderns, this was
not reality as it is experienced where change is the only
constant.
Is contemplation an authentic way of knowing? Is it
essentially different from active productive inquiry? The
first two definitions in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary (1967) certainly put it outside of the domain of
modern empirical science: "concentration on spiritual things
as a form of private devotion" or "a state of mystical
awareness of God's being". The word, temple, has the same
origin. The third and fourth definitions, however, provide
108
a less religious formulation: "an act of considering with
attention" and "the act of regarding steadily".
I believe contemplation is an authentic way of knowing.
In Grade Twelve mathematics, when first introduced to the
parabolic curve, I was not interested for a moment how to
use this information to solve a problem in differential
calculus. I was more intrigued by what this concept meant.
Here was this curve that got closer and closer to a
particular line defined as its limit but never reached it.
I was astounded - but our math teacher never spent time
marvelling at this with our class. It was another math
concept to be used and mastered in problem solving. This
metaphor of the parabolic curve makes clearer to me what
Grant meant when he said that the idea of limit is the idea
of God. In the same way, when students are introduced to
the Pythagorean theorem how many are made aware of the
context of its "discoverer," Pythagoras, the ancient Greek
mathematician who founded a religious cult that saw
mathematics as a gateway to contemplating the eternal?
Grant saw philosophy as a contemplative activity that
remains, despite the protests of people like Dewey, the
highest form of knowing. Criticising it out of existence,
as Dewey had attempted, was for Grant harmful, because it
was denying an activity that was fundamentally human. He
viewed it as another way of sustaining reflection on the
technological enterprise from outside of itself, partially
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in the hope of avoiding an ecological disaster. But even
this way of seeing contemplation as a tool for solving
ecological problems, obscures its meaning. We have no
modern language to adequately portray what this ancient
activity meant, for if contemplation is not defined as
useful for some purpose, then it ceases to be a "meaningful"
activity in the modern sense.
Finally, it needs to be made clear that regardless of
how much Grant and Dewey might have agreed on the broad
contours of a definition of technology, Dewey was much more
hopeful of this modern enterprise. Dewey had faith in the
possibilities of inquiry. Problems blamed on "technology" -
such as perhaps the threat of nuclear annihilation, the
thinning of the ozone layer, or general pollution - were, in
his view, the result of human failings or ignorance
(Hickman, 1990, pp. 156-157; p. 184). Technology per se
(i.e., active productive inquiry which oscilates in a zone
of intelligent experimentation), is the best we can do. We
have no alternative, Dewey said. Passive acquiescence to a
pre-determined fate is unacceptable - this is not what got
us to the top of the evolutionary spiral. We throw
ourselves into active productive inquiry to meet the
ecological challenges head on or die trying for "there is no
god to save us" (Hickman, 1990, p. 203).
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Grant was often accused of being a reactionary
pessimist who was "too much of a fatalist to propose solid
solutions" (Gunter, 1994, p. 45). Certainly, in my reading
of Grant, I have found it hard to escape feeling powerless
in the face of the technological juggernaut. In the same
vein, Baum (1989) criticized Grant for offering a definition
of technology that is totalizing. I think this accusation
would be better directed at Dewey than Grant because Dewey
sees no alternative for acting outside of our best efforts
at productive inquiry. With Grant one gets the sense that
there may be another way that exists outside of the paradigm
of technology. What that was Grant could only hint at, but
one could not accuse him of giving up:
In such a situation of uncertainty, it would be lacking
in courage to turn one's face to the wall, even if one
can find no fulfilment in working for or celebrating
the dynamo. Equally it would be immoderate and
uncourageous and perhaps unwise to live in the midst of
the present drive, merely working in it and celebrating
it, and not also listening or watching or simply
waiting for intimations of deprival which might lead us
to see the beautiful as the image, in the world, of the
good. (Grant, 1969a, p. 143)
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John Dewey's Theory of Education
Like his concept of technology, Dewey's theory of
education was based on a theory of experience. A short hand
way of expressing this is that education and technology for
Dewey were all of one piece: (i.e., education of the young
meant structuring appropriate learning experiences in which
they would be engaged in active productive inquiry) .
The quality of human experience was the standard by
which to judge any social arrangement, including the school.
Therefore, educators needed "a coherent theory of
experience, affording positive direction to selection and
organization of appropriate methods and materials" (Dewey,
1938, p. 30).
Dewey highlighted two criteria of experience that
educators should keep in mind when planning learning
activities. The first was the criteria of continuity, which
means that "every experience both takes up something from
those which have gone before and modifies in some way the
quality of those which come after" (Dewey, 1938, p. 35).
Learning tasks and experiences have to fit in with what the
learners had previously experienced. For .example, teachers
in a depressed inner city slum need to keep in mind the home
and play environment of their young charges when they plan
classroom activities if they hope to "reach" them. But once
they have connected with the youngsters, the teachers must
further recognize that the quality of the learning
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experience must be'such that it "arouses curiosity,
strengthens initiative and sets up desires and purposes"
(Dewey, 1938, p. 38) so that possibilities of opening up
future, richer experiences for the students are established.
The second criteria of experience that Dewey insisted
on for education was interaction. Every experienced
situation was an interaction of objective and internal
conditions, "a transaction taking place between an
individual and what, at, the time, constitutes his
environment" (Dewey, 1938, p. 43). The error of traditional
education, Dewey asserted, was that it only emphasized "the
external conditions that enter into the control of the
experiences but that it paid so little attention to the
internal factors which also decide what kind of experience
is had" (Dewey, 1938, p. 42).
Keeping in mind these two criteria of experience
continuity and interaction -- an educator always has the
responsibility of assessing each new situation and making
necessary modifications to planning (e.g., just because it
worked in the past does not mean it will work in the present
situation) .
How does an education based on a theory of experience
better prepare a person for the future? Dewey's answer is
powerfully consistent:
We always live at the time we live and not at some
other time, and only by extracting at each present time
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the full meaning of each present experience are we
prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This
is the only preparation which in the long run amounts
to anything3 • (Dewey, 1938, p. 49)
Since we live in an environment where the pace of
change is accelerating, it makes no sense to instruct
students with a body of knowledge which would become more or
less irrelevant. For Dewey, knowledge was not a static
thing anyway, so transmitting it was engaging in an "unreal"
activity. Knowing is always a verb for Dewey; one did not
grasp or discover knowledge, one constructed it. So, unless
students were encouraged to make their own knowledge on the
basis of their own experiences, they really were not
involved in education. Education led towards active
productive inquiry and that inquiry itself was, by
definition, an educative experience.
Dewey eschewed dualisms of any sort. The conflict
between "traditional" and "progressive" education was one
3 It is surprising to see how similar is Oman's view of
experience and education as cited by Grant: "It is never more
than pretence to start anywhere else than in the whole actu~l
present, or with anything less than the conclusion of our
experience. All we can do is use the fullest capacity of mind
which has been developed in us by the highest training of its
power with all its knowledge and all its insight: and from the
historical position in which we find ourselves, not to seek to
empty ourselves of our convictions, but to be ready to revise
them The only true empirical inquiry works with all
experience" (Grant, 1950, p. 43). However, what Oman clearly
implied is that this "highest training" was classical
education. Dewey was more ambiguous about the place of this
type of training in his theory.
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that went against his intellectual grain. His heart was
with the progressives, but he was concerned about how some
reformers were abrogating the authority and responsibility
of the teacher something which had been too oppressive in
the older system. The teacher still had a leadership role
in the "new" school, based, again, on his or her greater
maturity of experience which put the adult educator "in a
position to evaluate each experience of the young in a way
in which the one having the less mature experience cannot
do" (Dewey, 1938, p. 38). Hence, Dewey's theory of
education was not primarily child-centred.
Traditional educators who are concerned about
transmitting a cultural inheritance might be surprised to
discover that Dewey certainly did not deny the importance of
learning about the past. However, again, consistent with
his theory of experience, the question for educators was:
"How shall the young become acquainted with the past in such
a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in
appreciation of the living present?" (Dewey, 1938, p. 23).
A Critique of George Grant's Vision of Education in the
Light of John Dewey's Theory of Education
Comparing a vision with a theory is like comparing
apples and oranges. A vision lacks the systematic,
logically coherent structure found in a good theory. George
Grant's ideas of education have not been fleshed out enough
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to qualify as anything approaching a theory. It is clear
that Dewey's views on education were developed and applied
both in his own experience (1896-1904) with the "laboratory"
school at the University of Chicago and in the light of the
experience of various "progressive" schools that he observed
throughout the course of his life. Let us face it: an
educator looking for direction in how to fashion appropriate
learning experiences will get clearer guidelines from Dewey
than from Grant. Despite Dewey's disappointment with the
way many educational reformers had misapplied his ideas for
improving schools (Dworkin, 1959, p. 10), a pragmatist has a
practical appeal.
If my understanding of Hickman is correct, and if his
exegesis of Dewey's writing is reliable, then it would not
be reductionistic to maintain that, Dewey viewed education
and technology as virtually identical and that he felt that
this is as it should be. In contrast, Grant saw education
as something beyond technology. Grant would most likely
declare that active productive inquiry might be necessary
(although he regarded with suspicion the idea that knowledge
was constructed) but it was not sufficient in achieving
excellence in education. The question remains: How can
Grant's vision of education -- the interdependence of
knowing and loving -- be fruitfully criticized in the light
of Dewey's position on education as technology?
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Critique of Plato. As was explained in chapter four,
George Grant's vision of education was based on a Platonic
view of the nature of reality. Since it is impossible to
consider a direct Deweyan critique of Grant, John Dewey's
assessment of Plato's ideas might be helpful.
John Dewey did not accept Plato's theory of the forms.
Dewey could not see how one could get outside of experience
and Plato's assertion that the ultimate realities were
outside "the contingencies of even the most refined
experience" (Hickman, 1990, p. 93) seemed nonsense to him.
Dewey could allow Plato his flights of theoretical fancy -
this was sometimes part of inquiry - but Plato's insistence
that this movement away from experience into theory was a
one-way street went against the maxim of productive inquiry:
You had to come back "down-to-earth" and check your ideas
out in the messy world of immediate experience.
It would be tempting to simply state Grant's and
Dewey's difference on Plato and admit no rational
reconciliation of their foundational positions. However,
the interpretation of a particular writing can often be the
source of understanding the difference better. I have no
doubt that Grant would respond strongly to the following
contention that Hickman attributes to Dewey:
Plato's eagerness to apotheosize aesthetic ends had the
consequence of deprecating and demeaning the free play
of inquiry into materials and conditions that is
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necessary to a full spectrum of human interaction with
environing situations .... The Republic richly, and
sadly, documents the results for social thought in
general, even more specifically for democracy, of this
turn against productive experience. It is there that
Plato arrogates all meaningful technical skills to the
totalitarian social engineer. (Hickman, 1990, p~ 94)
Grant's response would probably be: To imply that the
central message of The Republic is that it describes a
totalitarian state is to miss the whole point of that
dialogue. The central question that Socrates and his
friends are concerned with is: What is justice? It is clear
in reading The Republic that the purpose of the whole
exercise of constructing the imaginary city-state was to
write in "big letters" what justice looked like in a
community in order to better see how it could exist in an
individual (Cornford, 1974, p. 55).
Is there not, at least, an implied yearning for a
certain type of state in The Republic? It can be argued
that Plato's "ideal" state was an aristocratic one in its
most literal sense: the rule by those best suited to govern.
Aristocracy understood in this "pure" sense, was not to be
equated with its historical debasement as rule by an
inherited nobility. To describe Plato's imaginary polis as
totalitarian is at best highly problematic and, at worst, an
anachronistic blunder: The ancient equivalent to the modern
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totalitarian state was a tyranny - the worst state in
Plato's typology of political regimes (Cornford, 1974, pp.
287-301) .
To return to the main point: When fabricating a mental
construct such as Plato's Republic in order to represent a
magnification of an individual soul, certain types of
political arrangements such as democracy do not work in
making an appropriate analogy. For in~tance, if an
individual were to operate on the democratic principle, then
the brain would have to defer to all its bodily members
(legs, arms, stomach, liver, etc.) to see if it should
remain in power to command and co-ordinate the body as a
whole. Or, to use the Platonic concept of soul, a person
whose reasoning part had lost control and in whom certain
violent emotions or strong desires demanded equal say with
reason in governing the soul as a whole, -- such a person
might be considered insane. When Dewey calls democratic
arrangements the most humane, he obviously does not imply
that this principle should govern one's internal life as can
clearly be seen in the following:
The ideal aim of education is creation of power of
self-control .... Impulses and desires that are not
ordered by intelligence are under the control of
accidental circumstances .... A person whose conduct is
controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of
freedom. Actually he [sic] is directed by forces over
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which he has no command. (Dewey, 1938, p. 64)
Therefore, for the analogy to work, in which a
political community accurately mirrors an individual as a
functioning unit, something like an aristocratic or
corporate model must be used where each organ of a society
is assigned the task for which it is best suited. Once the
characters in Plato's dialogue are able to see the principle
of justice operating on a macro level in the imaginary
state, they quickly comprehend how it is embodied in an
individual (Cornford, 1974, pp. 130-143).
Early in his academic career, Grant (1954a) published a
defense of Plato that was particularly directed at those who
taught that Plato advocated a totalitarian state:
If Plato·'s primary interest was politics, why was it
that in the classical world men [sic] with such utterly
different approaches to politics as Julian, Plotinus,
Origen and Augustine could all accept the Platonic
philosophy as true? This was possible surely because
they found in Plato not chiefly a political programme,
but answers to questions which they considered took
precedence over political philosophy. (Grant, 1954a, p.
187)
Near the end of his career, Grant concluded that it is
extremely difficult for us moderns to understand the
Republic "because most German and English scholars have, for
the last two centuries, read it through Kantian eyes (a
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great darkening) and Catholics through Aristotelian eyes
(better, but still a darkening) "(Grant, 1982, p. 108).4
Knowing and loving. Grant never advocated setting up a
school system based on the thought experiment of the
Republic. In fact, my experience in Grant's classes leads
me to wonder whether he was more of a Deweyan-style educator
than he might have cared to admit. Whatever differences
exist between Dewey and Grant on a theoretical level, Grant
ran his classroom discussion in a way that showed deep
respect for the students combined with the challenge to
think clearly. ~e allowed students' questions to
"sidetrack" the issue he chose to present and invited those
who were interested to continue the discussion in his office
after class. Even though he had acquired a national
reputation as a leading thinker, there was no trace of
arrogance in his dealings with undergraduate or graduate
students.
Like some 1960s style radicals, Grant did not treat
educational administration with the same respect. For
example, I approached him after the first class to sign a
permission form to audit his course for which, of course, I
4 Which begs the question: Is it correct to read it only
through Grantian eyes? My understanding and appreciation of
Plato pre-dates any conscious awareness of Grant's acceptance
of this ancient thinker. I was taught how to read The
Republic through the eyes of Professor Charles Taylor while
doing graduate work in political science at McGill University
in 1975-76. Three years later, hearing Grant speak in class
about Plato's allegory of the cave floored me. I consider
that a profound experience of "triangulation."
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had to pay a fee. After looking at the form for a few
seconds, he handed it back to me unsigned~ scowled something
about "administration" and invited me to continue coming
free of charge. Actions such as these only further endeared
him to me.
Let us assume that if John Dewey and George Grant had a
conversation about how teachers and students should relate
to one another and to the curriculum they could find common
ground in something that Novak (1994) has called the
"pragmatic loving stance" (p. 18). Although Dewey rarely
used the word, "love," 'it is implied in his educational
writings if one equates it with respect: respect for the
quality of experience -- that of the students, of oneself as
educator and of the experiences shared together.
Grant might object to the lack of intellectual rigour
perceived by many as one of the weak areas in educational
reform. Dewey might respond with, yes, it is a problem but
that is to be expected sometimes when change is initiated.
He might further reply with the hope that as reformers
recognize this inadequacy and address it properly they will
do so with an enriched understanding of how experiences and
education are deeply connected.
Grant would probably raise the issue about how one can
properly present the questions that were raised by people in
the past concerning the meaning of life if not enough
attention is paid to teaching history in the schools. Dewey
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might reply that teaching history in the traditional manner
was so cut off with living experiences of students that it
made no sense to them: It seemed irrelevant and was quickly
forgotten after a test. Dewey would repeat the challenge
quoted earlier in this chapter, that acquainting students
with the past be such that it be "a potent agent in
appreciation of the living present."
To which Grant might retort, "Do you mean that the past
has nothing to teach us except that 'we've come a long way,
baby'?" Dewey's response would depend on what he meant by
"appreciation of the living present" beyond our gratitude
for things such as antibiotics and indoor plumbing, things
our forebears had to live without. Perhaps, as well, Dewey
would concede Grant's point that we moderns have been
deprived of some "goods" along the way (e.g., being able to
drink pure water from any lake or river). But, then again,
Dewey never claimed that "progress" was inevitable.
Existence was "very precarious" and human life could
terminate as a result of natural events, human greed,
laziness or error (Hickman, 1990, pp. 156, 157, 203).
Grant's assertion that there are certain questions
raised by people in the past that "belong to human beings as
long as there are human beings" (Grant, 1986a, p. 102) would
be quickly followed by Dewey's assurance: Then these
questions will surface quite "naturally" but more
meaningfully in the lived experience of the present.
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Students might be motivated to research the past once their
curiosity is stimulated or they feel pressured by problems
actually experienced in the present.
"But do you know what is happening to research in the
humanities at the university level these days? Traditional
scholarship which once helped us to wait 'upon the past so
that we might find in it truths which might help us to think
and live in the present' (Grant, 1986a, p. 99), is being
usurped by technology -- what you call active productive
inquiry which is making a museum cultureS of the past.
These new research methods, borrowed from the natural
sciences, represent the past from a position of command from
which 'you can learn about the past; you cannot learn from
the past' (Grant, 1986a, p. 100, underlining mine) ," Grant
would protest with some emotion, recalling why he left
McMaster.
The debate would, no doubt, deepen with Dewey
challenging Grant on the meaning of "truths" and asking him
what he meant by the interdependence of loving and knowing
beyond the "pragmatic loving stance" that one takes with
oneself and with students inside an actual lived experience.
Grant would find this a very difficult question to answer.
S "I use the metaphor 'museum culture' because museums
are places where we observe past life as object. This present
situation is clear in the strange fact that at one and the
same time never has so much money been put into the organized
study of the past and never has the past had less meaning in
our lives" (Grant, 1986a, p. 98).
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Both would agree on the error of the fact/value split and
the myth of objectivity in all scientific research, yet
Grant would state his position that in the modern account of
knowing, love has been pushed out of this core activity
because love assumes the beauty of otherness (Grant, 1986,
p. 39).
The interdependence of love and knowledge is most
clearly manifest when we try to understand what it is
to love justice (and it must be remembered that the
love of justice is what all human beings are primarily
called to). We can only grow in our knowledge of
justice in so far as we love what we already know of it
and any new knowledge of justice then opens up the
possibility of further love which in turn makes
possible fuller knowledge .... In our daily attempts to
be just the central fact about human love is made
plain. Love is only love insofar as it has passed
through the flesh by means of actions, movements,
attitudes which correspond to it. If this has not
happened, it is not love, but a fantasy of the
imagination. (Grant, 1982, p. 108)
Love that "passes through the flesh" seems to be
Grant's way of articulating pragmatic love: It declares its
existence through actions and there is no arena in life too
mundane for it to enter. Grant cited the example of Charles
Darwin who exhibited a rich, loving recognition of every
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flower, bird or insect that he encountered on his country
walks. "However, Darwins's most general scientific truths
concerning animals ... are true whether or not animals are
greeted or not greeted with loving recognition" (Grant,
1982, p. 113). Grant used irony here to question those
"general scientific truths." In other words, if it is true
that all animals - humans included - can be explained as
matter-in-motion (sophisticated systems of complex chemical
reactions), then "love" itself is a chemical reaction. What
is love, then, beyond a hormonely-based sex drive for the
self-preservation of the species?6
The opposite to love for Grant was not hate but
indifference. At the core of the technological enterprise,
is a supreme indifference to the existence of anything as it
exists in its own right. Dewey expressed this well when he
stated that nature "is material to act upon so as to
transform it into new objects which better answer our needs"
(Hickman, 1990, p. 45). Whatever our reasons may be for
"transforming" nature into objects which better answer our
needs, no matter how deeply felt or nobly expressed, "it is
6 Grant's comment on the contemporary dispute between
evolutionists and creationists is worth noting. Although he
recognizes that the fundamentalist position is a "non-
starter," Grant (1984) asks: "Are not the fundamentalists
after something of great importance which the more complacent
scientists just miss? If Darwin is correct and all that
exists - including human beings - can be explained in terms of
'historical' necessity and chance, are there not very terrible
consequences for the possibility of any humane politics" (p.
66)?
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clear that the love involved in the modern project here is
not given to or received from the objects of the research,
but to other beings who will be the recipients of the goods
which result" (Grant, 1982, p. 112). What terrified Grant
about the future was what would happen to the pragmatic
loving stance in education as the technological paradigm of
knowledge had already moved beyond non-human nature as the
object of study, to human nature itself. I am convinced
that Dewey would not be able to offer the kind of
reassurance that would alleviate his fears.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This thesis has analyzed the question, "Is technology a
threat to education?" from the perspective of George Grant.
First, the life and thought of George Grant was summarized.
Second, Grant's definition of technology was abstracted and
explicated. Third, Grant's vision of education was
described. Fourth, Grant's position was critiqued in the
context of the views of John Dewey. In this final chapter,
summary conclusions will be drawn from the above analysis
and the implications of Grant's views will be assessed for
educational research and practice.
Summary Conclusions
In the preceding chapter the analysis of John Dewey's
concept of technology confirmed the validity of George
Grant's definition. Technology conceived as the co-
penetration of knowing and making can bear a reformulation
as Dewey's active productive inquiry without modifying the
essential meaning. The fact that Dewey and Grant disagree
on how the ancients understood knowing and making -- science
and art -- does not diminish their substantial agreement on
the nature of modern technology.
Grant's definition provides a foundational mooring and
philosophical depth to those who are confused in debates
about the introduction of new technologies. For example,
using the term technology to describe machines or inventions
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often focuses fears on the machines themselves. From
Grant's analysis, it is clear that machines are not
technology but artifacts of technology. As such, they have
no source of power outside of human design, agency, and use.
Technology as the co-penetration of knowing and making
must exist to some degree in a culture for technological
artifacts to affect that culture. For instance, witness the
failed attempts to introduce "technology" in "less
developed" countries. Near the end of World War II American
soldiers set up water purification systems in the
Philippines, both for themselves and the local residents.
Even though some Filipinos were trained in system
maintenance, the project broke down and fell into disuse.
From these and similar experiences in Third World countries
has arisen the idea of "appropriate technology": A "less
developed" society needs to be eased gradually into the
technological realm by introducing simpler artifacts that
can be assimilated and comprehended by the host culture.
Cuban (1986) documents how the culture of North
American schools has remained largely unaffected by the
introduction of such artifacts as radio, television and
film. In spite of the predictions of futurologists, is
there something resistant to the co-penetration of knowing
and making in modern education that cancels the power of
these artifacts to effect change? Will computers similarly
be impotent to alter educational practice? Or will the
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Internet do an "end run" around the institutional
"dinosaurs" called schools and, so, free up education from
the out-dated factory model?
Means (1994) argues that the appropriate use of such
educational machinery must develop in conjunction with a
reform of schooling if these artifacts are to move from the
periphery to the core of instruction: "There is a tremendous
need for teacher training that shows teachers the potential
o£ various technologies and for technical assistance that
helps teachers identify the particular technologies and
applications that will serve their purposes" (Means, 1994,
p. 18). Opposed to such a position are those such as
Postman (1992) who encourages teachers to become "loving
resistance fighters" and sees schools as the last
conservative bastion in a culture that has surrendered to
technology. Three questions arise from this debate: Will
Means' idea of technical training reform the culture of
schooling to be more receptive to the use of advanced
artifacts? Should such a reform be effected? Will the
Internet finally "deschool society" in Illich's (1970) sense
and render the above questions irrelevant?l
Secondly, just as Grant's concept helps us to
distinguish between technology and its artifacts, it also
1 The Internet may provide the opportuni ty to design
"learning webs" (Illich, 1970, pp. 72-104) that match teachers
with learners according to felt needs rather than enforcing
compulsory attendance in school buildings.
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points to the inadequacy of Ellul's much broader definition:
technology defined beyond machinery to include all rational
techniques and quantitativ~ methods that are oriented to the
goal of efficiency. For Grant, Ellul's work is a wake-up
call: It reveals the power of technology through a
comprehensive, sociological description of life in
modernity. However, this definition is inadequate because
it still suggests that the phenomenon is outside of
ourselves. 2 It allows us to believe that the uncomfortable
experience of earlier, cruder, mechanistic techniques can be
solved through the application of more humane ones.
Obvious, even silly, examples are how computers solve the
administrative problem of keeping track of individuals while
not appearing to treat them as numbers: cheaper personalized
license plates and bulk mailings of personalized letters.
A less obvious example of this type of belief is
expressed in the interior design of the McMaster University
Medical Centre. Through the use of informal spacing of
rooms, low lighting, colour and carpet, a patient receives
the impression of a less sterile, non-institutional setting
that invites a feeling of homey comfort. Yet this is a
centre of medical technology where humans are objects of
research in a more profound way through the study of gene
structure and experimentation on fetal tissue -- and some
2 See discussion of Grant's critique of Ellul in chapter
three.
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humans (defective infants whom nobody wants) are starved to
death through "benign neglect" (Grant, 1986a, p. 107). It
is almost as if the architect of this medical centre
designed the factory-like exterior of the building to remind
us that nothing substantially has changed.
Thirdly, the conventional view that technology is the
application of science hides from us, as both Grant and
Dewey show, in what way this science is applied at its core.
Knowing is folded towards making. Knowledge is constructed;
knowing is productive activity.
Grant's analysis implies that technology is
ontologically prior to both our knowing and making. For
Dewey this ontological priority is the culmination of a
historical development latent in the ancient world. For
Grant the assumption of this prior ontology marked the
beginning of modernity since it was a deliberate, self-
conscious turning away from the different ontology of the
ancients. Dewey defines technology from within its
ontology; Grant defines it from without.
Recognizing Grant's ontological position outside of
technology does -not imply that he has given an adequate
account for assuming this stance. His refusal to accept
Nietzsche's conclusions was an act of faith that was not
articulated in any systematic way. Before his death George
Grant had hoped to write a proper rebuttal to those such as
Heidegger, who convincingly demonstrated from historicist
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assumptions that it was impossible to get outside the
ontology of the modern age. Nevertheless, Grant's ironic
and poetic essays (which some critics have pejoratively
dubbed as rhetoric) evoke in many readers a sense that there
is something outside the modern technological paradigm with
which it is necessary for us to connect in order to prevent
the tightening circle from extinguishing something inside us
that is fundamentally human.
Although Dewey's thorough explication of active
productive inquiry resonates with Grant's formulation of
technology, it does not help the reader to take a critical
position outside of the modern enterprise. Rather, one is
thrown back into technology, de-constructing and re-
constructing knowledge to make it work in practice as one
searches for solutions to ecological problems generated by
previous artifacts of technology. What is the direction of
modern inquiry as productive power escalates and there is no
assurance that future technological artifacts will not be
more profoundly environmentally destructive?
Would Grant similarly question those educators who
claim to be critical theorists? Grant's analysis of
technology could be helpful to those who seek to establish
more democratic forms of community since it offers a
perspective that critiques the anti-democratic bias of a
technological society." Like Grant, critical theorists are
aware 'of how the formal, representative forms of democratic
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government have been pushed to the periphery of actual
political power in modern society. As Grant (1973) asserts,
"elections are more and more plebiscites in which the masses
are asked to choose between alternative groups of the elite
within the determined administrative system" (Grant, 1973,
p. 190). In addition, Grant's (1974) critique of modern
liberal justice as well as his view that technology is
undermining justice as traditionally understood (Grant,
1986a) needs to be read by those who are committed to
establishing some form of social justice.
Critical theorists often think about how ideology plays
a formative political role in education. Grant's definition
of ideology is particularly insightful in this regard. "Put
one way: ideologies are surrogate religions pretending they
are philosophies. Put the other way: they are surrogate
philosophies trying to fulfil the role of displaced
reverence" (Grant, 1973, p. 195). In this quotation is the
implication that ideology is the debasement of philosophy
arid religion. 3 Would critical theorists accept the
possibility that there was a genuine type of knowing
practiced by those who dealt with the questions of religion
or philosophy prior to the advent of modern ideologies?
Grant's challenge is indirect: Are there ways of
3 We give the term "ideology" much more respect than
Grant does. In Brock University's guidelines for projects and
theses I one suggestion for students is "to determine the sorts
of knowledge and ideological support required to work with a
specific method" (Putting the Pieces Together, 1991, p. 2).
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knowing not expressed within technology that do not depend
on experimentation? This question is implied throughout
Grant's work. Philosophy in the Mass Age (1966a) was his
most hopeful attempt at phrasing the question: How can the
ancient way of knowing -- contemplation -- temper modern
experimentation? 'MacIntyre (1984) articulates a similar
hope of recovering a type of Aristotelian social practice.
He has influenced action researchers such as Elliot (1991,
pp. 139-152) to reconsider the teachings of the ancients.
Reflective practitioners Drake and Miller (1991) see
MacIntyre as the modern founder of narrative research and
they enthusiastically espouse contemplation as a higher
level of reflective practice. Van Manen's (1990) attempt at
delineating a new human science based on hermeneutic
phenomenology seems similar to ancient philosophy. His
careful exploration of etymology and anecdotal information
with the aim of understanding the essence of parenting or
teaching echoes the dialogues of Plato. For example, Van
Manen's discussion of the meaning of "good" illustrates that
he is very close to the ancient conception that the good of
something was that for which it was fitted:
Our conception of knowledge and rational thinking has
been detached from its traditional affiliation with the
conception of the "good". And yet we have to
understand the "good" in order to give content to the
meaning of competence when we speak of an adult as a
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"good" teacher or "good" parent. (Van Manen, 1990, p.
159 )
Indeed, Plato is still considered relevant by some in
education (Hobson, 1993; Weiss, 1994). Arcilla (1995)
reviews Richard Rorty's vision of a non-Platonic yet very
Socratic liberal education. Stephen Hawking, a modern
physicist, is not a Platonist, but his proposal that the
universe is governed by a law of initial conditions that
shares the property of transcendence reflects the theory of
the Forms. Hawking contends that:
We can only know these laws by observing the universe
which they govern, but they are separate from the
universe. The laws do not depend on the universe for
their existence. That is, if the universe were to
cease to exist, the laws would continue. (Berryman,
1992, p. B13)
Is Hawking employing contemplation to arrive at such
conclusions? Does Hawking share with Einstein a way of
knowing outside of experimentation that allows the
development of cosmologies that will revolutionize
scientific research? Has Hawking been able to escape the
ontology of technology to connect with something "eternal"
without reading the ancients?
Grant was extremely pessimistic about the modern
project. In his view, modernity would not allow anything
outside of itself to limit or temper its imperial drive.
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The cautious optimism of Philosophy in the Mass Age was
replaced in his later writings with a brooding critique of
everything modernity stood for. Yet, he believed the
"eternal" could take care of itself. One wonders, if he
were alive today, how he would perceive the phenomenon of
"post-modernism." Is it a groping for those "intimations of
deprival"?
Implications for Educational Research and Practice
Can technological development be simply subsumed under
positivist science and quantitative methods in educational
research? Grant's answer is no. Positivism and
quantitative research are subsets of technology. Rejecting
positivism and foregoing the quantitative methods in
research will not necessarily mean that one has left the
realm of technology.4
Is the qualitative approach with its subsets of
ethnography, action research, narrative description and
reflective practice epistemologically free of the way of
thinking that gave rise to modern technological science?
From Grant's perspective, the answer is a qualified no or a
qualified yes. Inasmuch as we construct knowledge in any of
the above research activities, Grant would caution that we
4 From Grant's perspective, the definition of research
accepted by Brock's Faculty of Education is clearly within the
technological paradigm because of its orientation towards
"control of events" (Putting the Pieces Together, 1991, p.
10) .
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are still inside technology where knowing is productive
activity. Where reflective practice looks to Dewey (1933)
for its foundational assumptions, it needs to carefully
distinguish the type of thinking that characterizes
productive inquiry and types that rest on different
premises. Van Manen's (1990) work can be seen as a
transition from reflective practice based on technology to
one open to other foundational assumptions. Elliot (1991)
and Smyth (1992) demonstrate concerns that reflective
practice can easily become another technique whereby
teachers become more effective custodians of the young
subservient to centres of power that "have become even more
remote and the system of surveillance even more
comprehensiveil (Smyt'h, 1992, p. 286).
Technology as defined by George Grant can aid those who
wish to untangle these epistemological issues. The term
action research implies that experimentation (i.e., changing
one's actions in a class in order to comprehend a learning
situation) is the way of knowing. As such, action research
is as technological as imposing a structure on a class based
on the quantitative approach. ,The fact that the ethics of
research is a dominant concern for reflective practitioners
illustrates that our actions have consequences for human
beings who have become objects of our research in a
"naturalistic" setting. Thus Cooper (1991) defines
technology as action into nature.
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Narrative description, on the other hand, opens up
possibilities that meanings are discovered, not made:
Telling a story of the actions and speeches of another
is precisely how one reveals not who has acted and
spoken but the meaning of those deeds and words.
Meanings, the meanings of deeds and words, are not
"made" but rather are revealed or disclosed in stories.
(Cooper, 1991, p. 141)
For qualitative researchers in education, Grant helps
them to be more "heads up" about their work. However, we
must never underestimate the power of the quantitative
paradigm as we experience its tightening of our ontological
circle: What we perceive as differences in quality is
apparently completely explainable in quantitative terms.
Computers illustrate this power convincingly. They can
electronically transform all impressions and sounds through
the quantitative grid of a binary code. As these artifacts
increasing dominate our daily lives, they reinforce the
supremacy of quantity while at the same time hiding it
behind our "user-friendly" interactions with them.
Grant's vision of education has at its core a type of
contemplation that rests on the assumption that knowing and
loving are interdependent. One hesitates to try to
elaborate here what Grant meant beyond the few passages he
wrote about this. However, the closest one can come to
appreciating ~is vision is to consider two words often used
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in the place of knowing -- comprehending and understanding.
Although these two terms are often employed synonymously,
their etymology suggests two different types of knowing.
Comprehending has a Latin origin that literally means "to
seize with." "Understanding" is an Old English word that
suggests that one stands under that which one seeks to know.
Comprehending is a term which seems more at home in the
technological account of knowledge where we know things as
objects that are at our disposal. Understanding suggests a
stance that allows the other to be without being seized: It
is a listening to the other with careful attention so that
the other may tell us, unforced, who or what it is in a
language all its own (i.e., the observer allows a
heterogeneity to be without a prior classification scheme to
"better" comprehend it). It is the loving stance.
What are criteria that might be useful in considering
contemplation as a way of knowing in a modern framework?
First, there must be an openness to all that presents itself
to thought without prematurely emptying oneself of strongly
held convictions. In other words, each of us must recognize
and accept the particular context out of which we come and
in which we are rooted. For me this means that no matter
how much I admire Grant, I must not allow his critique of
Calvinism to force me to give up too hastily on my Dutch
Reformed heritage. Rather, the contemplative stance
requires that I maintain an openness to both Grant's
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critique and my own heritage and that I not revise any
convictions until I am convinced to do so in good
conscience.
Second, the power of memory must be cultivated in order
to nourish one's mind and recover some measure of control
over one's thinking in an age where we are so quickly
bombarded with too much information. Grant (1970) warns us
that:
our memories are killed in the flickering images of the
media, and the seeming intensity of events. There is
weakened in us the simplest form of that activity of
recollection which PlatoJknew to be the chief means to
wisdom. (p. vii)
Third, one must read and write carefully. For some, this
might mean reading fewer books at a slower pace. As well,
this means being aware of any tendency to read into a
passage or classifying a thinker according to some generally
accepted or personal typology that can so easily obscure the
author's meaning. In this regard Grant was an unusual
university instructor: He did not overwhelm his students
with long lists of required books. However, he did demand a
thorough, critical reading of those that were selected.
When he wrote, (and this can be seen especially in his
published work since 1965) Grant was painstaking in his
choice of words. He was aware of their powe~ to shape
thinking. This can be seen both in the words he avoided
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using - values, subjective, objective, ideal - and in the
type of etymological analysis that he employed to get at the
meaning of words like technology, object and project.
Reading and writing in a contemplative approach, then, is
attending to the meaning and power of words.
Fourth, one needs to engage in discourse with others so
that one's ideas are opened up for possible revision and
one's ability to think clearly is enhanced. Active
listening is the pre-requisite here. We must always check
to be sure that what we thought was said corresponds to what
the speaker intended to say.
Fifth, one's whole being must be engaged in the
activity of contemplation. Feelings and thoughts must be
allowed to intermingle without losing the rigour of a
disciplined intellect.
Sixth, contemplation may allow us to recover a broader
and deeper notion of reasoning that, as Grant suggested in
one of his classes, combines the Greek ideas of logos (with
its emphasis on logical, linear thinking) and nous (Gestalt,
the whole picture). We often refer to this as left- or
right-brain thinking. For Grant, modern science is logos
without nous. Whereas, nous without logos is mysticism.
Ideas for Further Study
1. New studies on the history of schooling that take into
account Grant's concept of technology would deepen our
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understanding of the relationship between technology
and education. What was it in the history of education
that resisted reform? Was it education in the Grantian
sense, or was it an older social arrangement that fit
an earlier technological framework (i.e., the factory
model of schools) but that, like every other business
in the age of high tech, needs to be "restructured"?
2. Is Grant's vision of education operating in any school
or university? How resistant is this type of education
to technology?
3. If Grant is correct, how do we incorporate new
machinery in schools? How helpful is his analysis in
dealing with computers in schools? A longitudinal
study could be done of a school that uses computers
extensively to see whether the criteria for education
in the contemplative sense is enhanced or discouraged.
4. Is feminist pedagogy more or less resistant to
technology in the Grantian sense? Is it more open to
the idea of the interdependence of knowing and loving?
5. Grant's claim that knowledge and loving are
interdependent needs more consideration because it
questions the whole modern scientific project at its
core. His notion needs further elaboration and it
needs to be tested in research and discourse.
Is technology a threat to education? Is the co-
penetration of knowing and making a threat to the
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interdependence of knowing and loving? This raises the old
questions of what knowing or knowledge is. For Grant, if
those types of questions arose in a class discussion, it
meant that education was still alive. Technology-as-
scholarship was a necessary but not sufficient condition for
setting the parameters of educational'discourse. Once
students moved from asking, "Who said what when?" to "What
do we see here and is what we see worth considering as
true?", then there was a participation in a conversation
that has not stopped.
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